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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Over
Over the last forty years,
years, the Supreme
Supreme Court has created a student-speech
student-speech
framework that allows schools
speech that the First
schools to restrict certain types of speech
First
Amendment
Amendment would otherwise protect. Emerging from four cases, this framework
prescribes four different
prescribes
different standards depending
depending on the type of speech
speech at issue. Student
Student
speech
school-sponsored setting or vehicle
speech that is disseminated through a school-sponsored
vehicle can be
be
restricted
legitimate pedagogical
restricted for any reason that is "reasonably related
related to legitimate
pedagogical
concerns,"'
concems,,,1 while student speech that merely happens
happens to occur at school
school is protected
unless it will either
the school
of
either substantially disrupt the work of
ofthe
school or invade
invade the rights of
other students. 2 School officials can also generally restrict student speech that is
3
"offensively lewd
lewd and
and indecent,"
or that
that can
can "reasonably
"reasonably be
be regarded
"offensively
indecent,") or
regarded as encouraging
encouraging
'4
illegal drug use.
therefore, essentially
essentially
use.',4 All of the action
action in student-speech
student-speech cases, therefore,
categories the speech
focuses on determining which of the four categories
speech fits into and whether
the applicable
applicable standard
standard has been met.
differentiation regarding
What this framework fails to include, however, is any differentiation
regarding the
speech
restriction at issue. This is true even though schools can use two distinct
speech restriction
distinct
methods of
regulating student speech:
speech: suppression
the speech itself
and after-the-fact
after-the-fact
ofregulating
suppression of
ofthe
itselfand
punishment
student-speech landscape itself gets more
punishment of the student speaker. As the student-speech
complex-given
schools' experimentation
experimentation with new disciplinary
complex-given schools'
disciplinary regimes along
along with

Associate Professor
Professor ofLaw,
of Law, Pace
of Law. J.D.,
J.D., Harvard
Law School,
School,
•* Associate
Pace University
University School
School ofLaw.
Harvard Law
2002; B.A., Yale University, 1999. I thank Bridget Crawford and John Taylor, as well as the
participants
at the February 2009
2009 New
New York Junior Scholars
at Fordham
Fordham Law
Law School,
School,
participants at
Scholars Workshop
Workshop at
for their very helpful comments on this piece.
1. Hazelwood
Sch. Dist.
Dist. v.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
260, 273
273 (1988).
(1988).
l.
Hazelwood Sch.
2.
Tinker v.
Des Moines
Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch.
Sch. Dist.,
Dist., 393
393 U.S.
U.S. 503,
503, 513
513 (1969).
(1969).
2. Tinker
v. Des
Indep. Cmty.
3. Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
No. 403
403 v.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
685 (1986).
(1986).
3.
675, 685
4. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
393, 396 (2007).
(2007).
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the tremendous
tremendous rise in student cyber-speech-the
cyber-speech-the blurring
blurring of that distinction has
become increasingly problematic, both doctrinally and theoretically.
The Article contends that the current
current framework, while appropriate
appropriate when the speech
restriction takes the form of suppression, is insufficient when applied to student
student
punishment. The free speech
speech and due process interests implicated
implicated by punishing
students
students for their speech
speech require additional
additional protection. In order for a school to
constitutionally
constitutionally punish
punish a student for her speech, it should not be enough to show that
that speech itself could be suppressed
Tinker, Fraser,
suppressed under Tinker,
Fraser, Hazelwood,
Hazelwood, or Morse.
Morse.
Schools should also have to show that (1) the student
student speaker had adequate prior notice
that the speech was prohibited
prohibited and (2) the actual punishment
punishment was reasonable.
This Article proceeds in three main parts. First, I examine
examine the four Supreme
Supreme Court
student-speech cases and demonstrate that the suppression/punishment
suppression/punishment distinctiondistinctionstudent-speech
while never explicitly
explicitly articulated in those cases-is consistent with all of them. I
situate this discussion in the larger context of the prior restraint doctrine in First
Amendment law. Second, I discuss why the distinction matters-why after-the-fact
after-the-fact
Amendment
punishment
heightened free speech
punishment of student speakers
speakers implicates heightened
speech and due process
interests that warrant more protection. Finally, I turn
turn to my proposed standard
standard for
student-punishment cases, and I describe how the additional
notice and
ofnotice
student-punishment
additional requirements of
reasonableness would provide
effectuate the
reasonableness
provide the necessary extra layer ofprotection
ofprotection and effectuate
underlying logic and theory of the Supreme
student-speech jurisprudence.
Supreme Court's student-speech
jurisprudence.
I.I. THE
STUDENT-SPEECH FRAMEWORK
THE SUPREME COURT'S
COURT'S STUDENT-SPEECH
FRAMEWORK

Amendment law generally
advance
First Amendment
generally recognizes a sharp distinction between
between advance
suppression
after-the-fact sanctions for such
such
suppression of speech-a "prior restraint"-and
restraint"-and after-the-fact
speech,
speech, such as civil or criminal
criminal liability. Since its 1931 decision in Near
Near v.
Minnesota,
particular stringency,
Minnesota, S5 the Supreme Court has reviewed prior restraints with particular
repeatedly
"comes to this Court bearing a heavy
repeatedly explaining that a prior restraint "comes
heavy
presumption
constitutionality., 6 Theoretically,
presumption against its constitutionality.,,6
Theoretically, the greater
greater animosity
animosity toward
prior restraints stems from the view that while "[a]
"[a] criminal statute chills, prior restraint
restraint
7
freezes"; 7 historically, it dates back to the American colonists'
colonists' opposition
opposition to England's
England's

5. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
5.
(1931).
6. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975)
(1975) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States,
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971);
(1971); Bantam
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
58, 70
(1963)).
(1963».
7. ALEXANDER
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY
MoRALrry OF CONSENT
CoNsENT 61 (1975).
(1975). The Supreme
Supreme Court
subsequently paraphrased
paraphrased this famous quotation, stating that "[i]f
"[i]f it can be said that a threat of
of
subsequently
criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills'
'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes'
'freezes' it at least for
(1976).
the time."
time." Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
described and analyzed additional commonly-cited
commonly-cited concerns
concerns
Martin Redish has thoroughly described
about prior
prior restraints, including
including that they:
expression before it has a chance
chance to be heard, (2) are easier to obtain
(1) shut off expression
(3) lack the
than criminal convictions and therefore are likely to be overused, (3)
constitutional procedural
criminal process, (4) require
constitutional
procedural protections
protections inherent in the criminal
adjudication
of messages,
adjudication in the abstract, (5) improperly affect
affect audience reception ofmessages,
and (6)
(6) unduly extend the state's power
power into the individual's
individual's sphere.
Martin H. Redish, The Proper
ProperRole ofthe
ofthe Prior
PriorRestraint
Doctrinein First
Theory,
Restraint Doctrine
First Amendment Theory,
53, 59 (1984);
also, e.g., Ariel L. Bendor, Prior
70 VA. L. REv. 53,
(1984); see also,
Prior Restraint,
Restraint,
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use ofa
of a licensing system to censor
censor the press.88 Although
Although the prior restraint doctrine can
9
get blurry at the margins,
margins, the basic distinction remains entrenched. 9
The subset ofstudent-speech
of student-speech case law, however, did not develop that way. Since the
Supreme Court's first foray into the student-speech
Supreme
student-speech world in 1969, the Court has never
recognized, nor even substantively
substantively discussed, a distinction between0 suppression of
of
speaker.'10
of the
after-the-fact punishment
and after-the-fact
student speech and
punishment of
the student
student speaker.
Given the Supreme
Supreme Court's general tendency toward
toward adjusting
adjusting and reducing
reducing
constitutional protection in the school setting,
setting,"II it is not entirely
entirely surprising that the
Supreme Court has taken a different approach in that context. What is striking,
Supreme
however, is that the Supreme Court has created a student-speech
student-speech framework that
actually functions more logically
and
speech-protectively
logically
speech-protectively when it is applied to ex ante
speech
speech suppression
suppression as opposed to ex post student punishment. This phenomenon
phenomenon has
has
largely
student-speech cases that
largely resulted from the specific fact patterns of the four student-speech
have reached the Supreme Court. As this Article will describe, in none of those four
cases was a student speaker
speaker punished for his speech without having first received
received
2
advance
advance warning from school officials about
about the speech in question.
question.'12 In other words,
the Supreme
Supreme Court has never confronted
confronted a case where a speech
speech restriction solely took
the form of after-the-fact
after-the-fact student punishment. As a result, the appropriate protections
Incommensurability,
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 289 (1999);
(1999);
Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism of Means,
L.A. Powe, Jr.,
Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction,
Injunction, 61 U. COLO.
COLO. L. REv. 55 (1990)
(1990) (discussing
(discussing the prior
restraint
Main Scordato,
Scordato,
restraint doctrine
doctrine as applied to national security and press defendants); Marin
Distinction
of the Doctrine
Doctrineof
PriorRestraint,
Restraint,68 N.C. L.
Distinction Without aa Difference:
Difference: AA Reappraisal
Reappraisal ofthe
ofPrior
REV.
REv. 1I (1989).
(1989).
Near,283 U.S. at 713-15;
8. Near,
713-15; see also,
also, e.g., Scordato,
Scordato, supra
supra note 7, at 5 ("The distinction
distinction
between
between laws that impose a prior restraint on speech and those that constitute a subsequent
sanction can be traced to the eighteenth
eighteenth century.").
supra note 7,
9. See, e.g.,
e.g., Redish, supra
7, at 53 ("Although
("Although the prior restraint doctrine pervades
inconsistencies in the doctrine's
doctrine's
Supreme Court rhetoric, the Court's decisions reveal inconsistencies
supranote 7, at 22 ("Despite the frequency with which
of
which the doctrine of
application."); Scordato,
Scordato, supra
prior restraint is cited in court
court opinions and the level of general
general recognition it has achieved,
achieved,
of a prior restraint
relevant case law does not provide a concise
concise and logically coherent
coherent definition ofa
restraint
on speech. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the years since Near
Near has affixed the prior restraint
exceptionally diverse group of
laws, regulations,
oflaws,
regulations, and government actions.").
label to an exceptionally
10. The Executive Director of the Student
Student Press
Press Law Center
Center has similarly
similarly observed:
speech is the most noxious and
Outside the schoolhouse gate, the prior restraint
restraint of
ofspeech
disfavored of all government
government speech regulations....
regulations.... Tinker and its progeny,
however, do not differentiate
differentiate between
between the ability to restrain
restrain speech and the ability
to punish it-indeed, the regulation
regulation at issue in Tinker was itself a prior restraint.
Tinker: Students
Students Are "Persons
UnderOur
OurConstitution-Except
Constitution-Except
Frank D. LoMonte,
LoMonte, Shrinking
Shrinking Tinker:
"Persons"" Under
1323, 1351 (2009).
When They Aren't, 58 AM. U. L. REv.
REv. 1323,
11.
119-23, 174; see also,
II. See infra text accompanying
accompanying notes 119-23,
also, e.g., Kristi L. Bowman,
Bowman,
PublicSchool Students'
Students 'Religious
Public
Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination,
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REv.
& n.10
187, 190 &
n.1 0 (2007) ("I
("I often tell my education law students that examining
examining constitutional
law in K-12
K- 12 public schools is aa bit like looking at one's selfin
self in a fun house mirror-although
mirror-although the
basic image (or constitutional
constitutional principle) is the same, we do not have to look very
very closely
closely to see
back--this part
is
some significant
significant variations
variations from the image we would expect
expect to be reflected back-this
part is
taller, that one is wider, something
something else is barely
barely there.").
the four cases-Hazelwood-there
cases-Hazelwood--there was no punishment at all; the sole
12. Indeed, in one of
ofthe
method of restriction
itself. See infra
infra text accompanying
restriction was suppression of the speech itself.
accompanying notes
notes
33-38.
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Supreme Court's studentfor that particular scenario have never been
been built into the Supreme
speech framework.
Taking
Taking a fresh look at the Supreme Court's four student-speech
student-speech cases with the
suppression/punishment distinction in mind is illuminating. First, in Tinker v. Des
Des
suppression/punishment
Moines Independent
Independent Community School District1
1969 case in which
Moines
Districi 33-the
-the landmark 1969
which
"shed their constitutional
the Supreme Court famously declared
declared that students did not "shed
constitutional
14
-the studentrights to freedom of speech
speech or expression at the schoolhouse
schoolhouse gate"
gate,,14-the
plaintiffs were objectors
objectors to the Vietnam War and decided to express that view by
15
When
the plan,
wearing black armbands
armbands to school. 15
When school district officials
officials learned
learned of
ofthe
they adopted a policy prohibiting all students from wearing armbands on school
property.16 Despite this ban, several
property.16
several students showed up at school wearing black
black
armbands, at which point they were suspended.
suspended.1I?7 The students'
students' subsequent First
armbands,
First
Amendment lawsuit
suppression and subsequent
Amendment
lawsuit thus implicated
implicated both advance suppression
subsequent
punishment.
Tinker Court
from
In analyzing the case, the Tinker
Court stated that prohibiting students from
expressing opposition to the Vietnam War
War would violate their constitutional
constitutional rights
unless the ban could "be justified
students' activities
justified by a showing [either] that the students'
would materially
school," or
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school,"
or
others.'IS8 Here,
district's
would invade the rights of others.
Here, the Court concluded, the school district's
actions were unconstitutional
unconstitutional because
"the record [did] not demonstrate
because ''the
demonstrate any facts
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption
of
which might reasonably
disruption of
or material interference
interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the
19
school premises
occurred.,,19
premises in fact occurred."'
The Tinker Court's reasoning thus did not draw any distinction between the advance
advance
suppression
after-the-fact punishment.
suppression and after-the-fact
punishment. To be sure, the Court mentioned the fact
fact
that no disruption had actually occurred as a result ofthe
of the speech. But it made clear that
had school officials reasonably
reasonably forecast substantial disruption or invasion of other
other
students'
students' rights in the first place, they would not have had to wait to take measures to
prohibit the student speech.
speech. This prediction
prediction would have justified
justified preemptively
preemptively
restricting
restricting the speech
speech and sanctioning
sanctioning any students who violated
violated that ban. Under the
same
same logic, because
because here there was no such reasonable
reasonable forecast, but rather only an
20
"undifferentiated
or apprehension
apprehension ofdisturbance,
of disturbance,",,20
"undifferentiated fear
fear or
the armband
armband ban was invalid.
As such, there was no valid predicate
predicate for the students'
students' suspension. Thus, the
the
constitutionality
the initial speech suppression
suppression and the after-the-fact
constitutionality of
ofthe
after-the-fact punishment rose
and fell together.
Seventeen
School DistrictNo.
DistrictNo. 403 v.
Seventeen years
years later, the Supreme
Supreme Court decided Bethel School
21
Fraser,
Fraser,21 which involved a very different type of speech from the core
core political
Tinker. Matthew
Matthew Fraser, a high school student, prepared
prepared a speech
speech
expression in Tinker.

13. 393
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
13.
(1969).
14. Id.
14.
[d. at 506.
15. Id.
15.
[d. at 504.
16. Id.
[d.
17. Id.
[d.
18. Id.
513.
18.
[d. at 513.
19. Id.
[d. at 514.
20. [d.
Id. at 508.
21.
21. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
(1986).
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nominating another
another student
student for student
student council
council vice
vice president.
president. The
The speech
speech used
used an
an
nominating
22
"elaborate,
"elaborate, graphic,
graphic, and
and explicit
explicit sexual
sexual metaphor":
metaphor,,:22 Fraser
Fraser described
described the
the student
student
takes his point and pounds
pounds itit in
candidate as aa man
man who
who was
was "firm
"firm in his
his pants...
pants ... who takes
candidate
23
Before
...
[who] drives
drives hard, pushing
pushing and
and pushing
pushing until finally-he
fmally-he succeeds.
succeeds.,,23
...
[who]
giving the speech, Fraser discussed
of
discussed its contents
contents with two
two different teachers, both
both of
whom advised
advised him that the speech was "inappropriate,"
"inappropriate," that he
he "probably
"probably should not
not
24
Additionally, a
deliver it,"
it," and that he might suffer "severe
"severe consequences
consequences as a result.",
result.,,24
deliver
"includ[ed] the use of obscene,
obscene,
prohibited conduct
conduct that "includ[ed]
high school disciplinary rule prohibited
profane language.,,25
warnings, Fraser gave the speech.
speech. He was
was then
then
language. ' 25 Despite these warnings,
profane
called into
into the assistant
assistant principal's
principal's office;
office; after
after admitting that he had "deliberately
"deliberately used
called
speech," Fraser
sexual
sexual innuendo
innuendo in the speech,"
Fraser was suspended
suspended for three days
days and
and told that his
his
speaker. 26
candidates for
of candidates
name was
was being
being removed
removed from the
the list
list of
for graduation
graduation speaker.26
name
Fraser's case, like Tinker, thus
thus implicated
implicated both an advance
advance speech
speech restriction
restriction (or, at
Tinker,
least, an attempt at
at such restriction)
restriction) and after-the-fact
after-the-fact punishment. And, as
as in Tinker,
the validity of the advance
advance restriction
restriction and the subsequent
subsequent punishment
punishment rose and fell
separate them out, but generally
together. Indeed, the Court did not separate
generally stated that it was a
appropriate function of public
"highly appropriate
public school education
education to prohibit the use of vulgar
vulgar
"schools must teach by example the
discourse," and that "schools
and offensive
offensive terms in public
public discourse,"
order." 27 The Court asserted
values of a civilized
civilized social order.',27
asserted that the sexual innuendo
innuendo in
students" and "could
offensive to both teachers
Fraser's speech
speech was "plainly
"plainly offensive
teachers and students"
"could well
did try to
audience." 28 Interestingly, Fraser did
be seriously
seriously damaging
damaging to its less mature audience.',28
teachers' warnings, he had not received adequate
argue that despite the teachers'
adequate notice that his
29 But the Court rejected this
speech could
could subject him to disciplinary
disciplinary sanctions.
sanctions.29
speech
argument, stating that the "full
"full panoply of procedural due process protections"
protections" were
30
unnecessary
context,30
and that here, "the school disciplinary rule prohibiting
unnecessary in this context,
'obscene' language
language and
the prespeech
prespeech admonitions
admonitions ofteachers
of teachers gave adequate warning
'obscene'
and the
warning
sanctions." 31 Notably, Justice
to Fraser that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions.,,3l
teachers' warnings had
Stevens dissented on the grounds that neither the rule nor the teachers'
provided Fraser with sufficiently clear notice that he might be punished for his
32
speech.32
The Court therefore did not have to reach the question of whether, had no

Id.
Id. at 678.
concurring).
(Brennan, J.,
J., concurring).
Id.at
at 687
687 (Brennan,
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 686.
29. Id.
(1975), where it had
Court made reference
30. Id.
reference to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975),
Id.Here, the Court
the charges
charges
notice of
of the
were entitled
entitled to notice
suspensions were
held that students subjected to short-term suspensions
Article subsequently
against them and an opportunity to respond to those charges. As this Article
different from the one
argument was qualitatively
qualitatively different
discusses in
in more detail, Fraser's due process argument
of the charges
charges
for notice not ofthe
on the
the need for
made in
in Goss,
Goss, given that Fraser's argument centered on
text
infratext
inthe first place. See infra
of speech was prohibited in
type ofspeech
him, but rather about what type
against him,
109-18.
accompanying notes 109-18.
31. Bethel,
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 686.
Stevens argued:
argued:
Justice Stevens
J., dissenting).
dissenting). Justice
Id. at
at 691-92 (Stevens, 1.,
32. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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advance warning been given at all, Fraser's punishment
punishment would still have been
constitutional.
Viewed
essentially
Viewed through the suppression/punishment
suppression/punishment lens, Tinker and Fraser
Fraser are essentially
each other. In
mirror images
images of
ofeach
In Tinker,
Tinker, the basis for the initial speech
speech suppression was
unconstitutional,
of the student speakers for violating
unconstitutional, and thus the ex post punishment
punishment ofthe
that ban was unconstitutional
Fraser,it was permissible for the
unconstitutional as well. Conversely, in Fraser,
school to restrict
restrict the speech in advance, and thus it was permissible to punish the
student speaker
speaker for disobeying that restriction.
33
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,
decided shortly thereafter, involved
Hazelwood
Kuhlmeier,33
involved only an advance
speech restriction. There, editors of a high school newspaper filed suit after their
their
school principal censored two articles--one
articles--one about teen pregnancy
and
one
about
pregnancy
divorce-from an issue of the newspaper
divorce-from
newspaper before it went to the press. 34 The principal
justified the censorship on the grounds that the teen-pregnancy
teen-pregnancy article's sexual
inappropriate for younger students and that both articles could invade
references were inappropriate
invade
the privacy of the student subjects
subjects and their families. 35
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
The Supreme
constitutionality of the principal's
principal's actions,
identifying
just happened to occur on school premises
identifYing a distinction
distinction between
between speech
speech that
thatjust
premises
(such as the Tinker armbands) and speech
(such
speech that was actually communicated
communicated through a
school-sponsored medium (such as the school newspaper
school-sponsored
newspaper at issue).
issue).366 The Court ruled
that school officials could exercise greater
greater control over the latter category
category "to
''to assure
that participants
participants learn whatever lessons the activity
activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate
inappropriate for their level of
of
maturity, and that the views of
the individual speaker are not erroneously
erroneously attributed to
ofthe
37
the school.,
In sum, educators
"exercis[e] editorial control over the style and
school.,,37
educators could "exercis[e]
content ofstudent
of student speech in school-sponsored
school-sponsored activities so long as their actions [were]

It does seem to me ...
... that if a student is to be punished for using offensive
offensive
speech, he is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the
consequences
speech protected
protected by the First
consequences of its violation. The interest in free speech
Amendment
Amendment and the interest
interest in fair procedure
procedure protected
protected by the Due Process
Process Clause
of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment combine to require this conclusion.
One might conclude
One
conclude that respondent
respondent should have known that he would be
punished
(I) It violated the
punished for giving this speech
speech on three quite different theories: (1)
"Disruptive Conduct"
Conduct" rule
rule published
published in the student handbook;
(2) he was
"Disruptive
handbook; (2)
(3) the impropriety is so obvious that no
specifically warned
warned by his teachers; or (3)
required....
specific notice was required....
Id.
at 691-93.
691-93. Justice
Stevens went
went on to conclude
that the student-handbook
student-handbook provision
Id at
Justice Stevens
conclude that
provision (which
"Conduct which
is
stated that "Conduct
which materially
materially and substantially
substantially interferes with the educational
educational process is
prohibited,
including the
the use
obscene, profane
of obscene,
profane language")
language") applied
applied only
only ambiguously
ambiguously to
to this
this
prohibited, including
use of
situation; that
that the teachers
situation;
teachers had advised
advised Fraser not to give the speech
speech but had not told him that it
inappropriate that Fraser
"might violate
violate a school rule"; and that the speech was not so obviously inappropriate
"must have
known that
the school
school administrators
administrators would
would punish
punish him
him for
for delivering
delivering it."
it." Id.
at
Id. at
"must
have known
that the
693-96.
(1988).
33. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
34. Id.
Id. at 263-64.
263--64.
Id. at 263. The principal
35. Id.
principal was particularly
particularly concerned that the parents featured in the
divorce article had not been given a chance to comment. Id.
Id.
36. Id
Id. at 270-71.
36.
270-71.
271.
37. Id.
Id. at 271.
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reasonably
pedagogical concerns.,,38
concerns." 38 The Hazelwood
Hazelwood Court
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
reasoned
reasoned that based
based on the principal's cited motivation, his censorship
censorship of the articles
39
met that lenient standard.39
case-Morse v.
Finally, the Supreme
Supreme Court's most recent student speech case-Morse
Frederick,4° decided
2007-returned to the Fraser
Fraserand Tinker pattern of both an
Frederick,40
decided in 2007-retumed
initial attempt at speech
speech suppression and subsequent punishment
punishment once that prohibition
prohibition
was disobeyed. In Morse,
Morse, students at an Alaska high school were allowed to leave class
in order to watch the Olympic
Olympic torch relay as it passed
passed by the school.441' Just as the
torchbearers
camera crews approached
torchbearers and camera
approached the school, high school
school senior
senior Joseph
Frederick and his friends unfurled a fourteen-foot banner that read "BONG
"BONG HiTS 4
JESUS." The high school principal, who thought that the banner violated
JESUS."
violated a school rule
prohibiting
substances, immediately
immediately
prohibiting any expression
expression advocating the use of illegal substances,
42 Frederick's
approached the students and ordered them to take down the banner.42
approached
Frederick's
friends complied, but Frederick did not.43 The principal then confiscated
confiscated the banner
Frederick for ten daYS.44
days. 44 The Supreme
Supreme Court upheld the
and suspended
suspended Frederick
constitutionality of the principal's
constitutionality
principal's actions, holding that schools may restrict
restrict student
student
"that can reasonably
use.' 45 Thus, as in
speech ''that
reasonably be regarded
regarded as encouraging
encouraging illegal drug use.''''5
Tinker and
and Fraser,
Fraser,the constitutionality
speech-suppression attempt and the
constitutionality of the speech-suppression
subsequent student punishment
subsequent
punishment again rose and fell together.
Supreme Court cases provide a fairly comprehensive
Taken together, these four Supreme
framework governing what types of student
student speech
speech can
can be restricted
restricted by school
course, speech
officials. As an initial matter, of
ofcourse,
speech that is entirely
entirely unprotected by the First
Amendment-such as, for example,
Amendment-such
example, defamation, true threats, or incitements to
46
imminent lawless action-lacks any protection
protection in schools
schools as well. 46
Outside of those
exceptions, Tinker and Hazelwood generally divide the student-speech
narrow exceptions,
student-speech universe
Tinker's substantial-disruption/invasion-of-rights
in two, with Tinker's
substantial-disruption/invasion-of-rights prongs applying to
independent student speech, and Hazelwood's
"legitimate pedagogical
concern" test
independent
Hazelwood's "legitimate
pedagogical concern"
applying to school-sponsored
school-sponsored student speech. Fraser
Fraser and Morse,
Morse, in turn,
tum, provide
speech-that is, plainly
special rules for particular categories of disfavored
disfavored student speech-that
offensive speech and advocacy of illegal drug use.
Yet nothing in this framework explicitly explains how school officials can
can restrict
such speech. And the above reexamination of the four cases through the
suppression/punishment lens makes
suppression/punishment
makes clear
clear why this is so: the Supreme Court has never
never

38.
39.
40.

Id.
[d. at 273.
Id.
/d. at 276.
U.S. 393 (2007).
551 U.S.

41. Id.
/d. at 397.

42. Id.
[d. at 397-98.
397-98.
43. Id.
[d. at 398.
44. Id.
[d.
45. Id.
45.
/d. at 397.
46. See,
See, e.g.,
46.
e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
343, 358-60 (2003); Chaplinsky
Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,
Pedophiles in
Hampshire, 315 U.S.
U.S. 568, 571-72
571-72 (1942);
(1942); Gabrielle Russell,
Russell, Comment, Pedophiles
Wonderland: Censoring
Censoringthe Sinful in Cyberspace,
Cyberspace,98 1.
J.CRIM. L. &
& CRIMINOLOGY
CRIMINOLOGY 1466, 1477
1477 &
&
Wonderland:
n.67 (describing the "nine basic categories
categories of unprotected
unprotected speech"
speech" as including "obscenity,
fighting words, defamation,
defamation, child pornography, perjury, blackmail, incitement
incitement to imminent
lawless action, true threats, and solicitations
crimes" (citation
solicitations to commit crimes"
(citation omitted)).
omitted».
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of restriction.
needed to distinguish between the suppression and punishment methods ofrestriction.
officials had also
also first tried
In each case where a student speaker was punished, school officials
unsuccessfully) to suppress the speech itself.
itself.
(albeit unsuccessfully)
some counter-factual situations.
situations. What if,
if, for
for instance, there had
had been
But imagine some
Morse, and the high school principal had immediately
immediately
no applicable school rule in Morse,
banner
suspended Frederick without first giving him the opportunity to take down the banner
Hazelwood principal
on his own? Similarly, what if the Hazelwood
principal had not objected to the two
articles ahead of time, but had simply punished the student journalists after the issue
came out? For that matter, what if the teachers to whom Fraser had shown his speech
never warned him against giving it and there was no school policy on point? Would
such scenarios present a constitutional
constitutional problem, notwithstanding the Court's view that
the underlying speech in those cases was unprotected?
In Part II, II argue that the answer is yes. Ironically, despite the general presumption
presumption
Supreme Court has
that prior restraints do more harm than ex post sanctions, the Supreme
logical-and indeed more speechcreated a student-speech
student-speech framework that is more logical-and
protective-in the context of
speech suppression as compared
protective--in
ofspeech
compared to after-the-fact student
punishment. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, however, the lower courts have generally
generally failed to focus on
of
this distinction, instead applying the framework with equal force to both categories
categories of
cases.
A DIFFERENCE
DIFERENCE
II. A DISTINCTION WITH A

There are three related reasons why the Supreme
Supreme Court's student-speech
student-speech framework
is insufficient
insufficient when the only form of speech restriction is after-the-fact student
is
of a student
punishment. First, punishment
punishment ofa
student speaker-when
speaker-when that speaker
speaker did not receive
receive
adequate
adequate notice that his or her speech
speech could lead to such punishment
punishment or when the
punishment imposed
imposed is so disproportionate
disproportionate as to be unreasonable-is
unreasonable--is inconsistent
inconsistent with
the theoretical justifications
justifications for the framework. Second, such punishments
punishments encroach
encroach on
on
students' First Amendment
Amendment rights in a way that the framework does not adequately
adequately
students'
account for. Finally, such punishment
punishment also implicates
implicates due process rights that warrant
more protection.
CurrentStudent-Speech
Student-Speech Framework
A. The Theoretical
Theoretical Justifications
Justifications for the Current
Framework
The
student
The significance
significance of the distinction between speech
speech suppression
suppression and student
punishment becomes
punishment
becomes clear
clear upon examining
examining the underlying
underlying reasoning
reasoning of
of the Supreme
Supreme
Court's student-speech
student-speech framework.
framework. Its
Its structure
structure is grounded on a fundamental
fundamental
compromise,
Tinker: students
students do not shed their First Amendment
Amendment rights
compromise, dating
dating back
back to Tinker:
at the
schoolhouse door, but
the schoolhouse
but neither
neither do they
they enjoy the
the same level of First Amendment
Amendment
protection that adults possess. Pursuant to the Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
protection
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
framework, schools can
can restrict
restrict speech
speech that would otherwise
otherwise be protected
protected by the First
First
Amendment. As Justice
Justice Alito
Alito recently stated
stated in Morse,
Morse, the First Amendment
Amendment reductions
authorized by
"special characteristic[s]
by that framework are based on "special
characteristic[s] of the school
school
setting. 47 Indeed, all of the Court's
students' free
setting.'.47
Court's recognized
recognized rationales
rationales for reducing
reducing students'
free

47. Morse,
Morse, 551 U.S.
U.S. at
at 424
424 (Alito,
(Alilo, J.,
J., concurring).
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Fraser,Hazelwood,
Hazelwood,and
and Morse--can
Morse--canbe largely
expressed in Tinker,
Tinker, Fraser,
speech
speech rights-as expressed
distilled to two school-specific
school-specific justifications: protection and education.
In all four Supreme Court cases, the need for protection--of
protection-of other students'
students' wellbeing and/or of
the school environment
ofthe
environment as a whole-was
whole-was a core justification underlying
"substantial
the particular
particular speech
speech restrictions
restrictions that the Court permitted. Tinker's
Tinker's "substantial
disruption" and "invasion
"invasion ofrights"
of rights" prongs both center on this concern. Indeed, Tinker
disruption"
speech-protective student-speech
student-speech case, yet the Court readily held that
is the most speech-protective
of the learning
students' rights or the functioning ofthe
student speech that threatened
threatened other students'
learning
preemptively restricted. The Fraser
environment could be preemptively
Fraser Court also raised the
"acutely insulting
student-protection flag, describing Fraser's speech
speech as "acutely
insulting to teenage
teenage girl
to its less
the
"seriously
students" and even
even
stating
that
speech
could
be
"seriously
damaging
' 48
audience.
mature audience.'",g
pedagogical concerns
Several ofthe
of the legitimate pedagogical
concerns identified
identified by the Hazelwood Court
Several
likewise centered on issues of student protection, such as shielding students from
49
inappropriate for their level of maturity"
speech "that
''that may be inappropriate
maturity''''9
or that encourages
encourages them
sex." 50
"irresponsible sex."so
and
use and "irresponsible
alcohol use
or alcohol
to engage in unsafe behaviors like
like drug
drug or
dissociate themselves
schools' ability to dissociate
Hazelwood's
Hazelwood's emphasis on preserving schools'
themselves from
5
of protecting the
' meanwhile,
of political controversy,
matters ofpolitical
controversy,SI
meanwhile, connects to the notion ofprotecting
functioning of the educational
educational environment
environment as a whole.
Most recently, the Morse
Morse Court explicitly relied on the protection
protection rationale in
speech that advocated
holding that schools could restrict student
student speech
advocated illegal drug use, even
if the speech
speech was not "plainly offensive"
offensive" under Fraser
Fraser and did not satisfy either
disruption" or "invasion
"invasion ofrights"
of rights" prong. The Court extensively
Tinker's "substantial
"substantial disruption"
Tinker's
extensively
discussed the dangers that drug use posed to students and concluded
concluded that the link
between peer pressure
pressure and drug use meant that "[s]tudent
"[s]tudent speech
speech celebrating illegal
use..,
drug use
... poses a particular
particular challenge for school officials working to protect those
52
entrusted to their care."
This, the Court concluded,
entrusted
care."S2
concluded, entitled schools to restrict such
such
concurring opinion in Morse
speech. Justice Alito's concurring
Morse similarly emphasized
emphasized the studentprotection
protection angle, indeed
indeed communicating
communicating that he was joining the majority solely on this
basis:
of the school
[D]ue to the special
special features ofthe
school environment,
environment, school officials must have
greater authority to intervene before
before speech leads to violence. And, in most cases,
permits school officials to step in before
Tinker's "substantial
Tinker's
"substantial disruption"
disruption" standard
standard pennits
actual violence
violence erupts.
isjust as
Speech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat to student safety that isjust
obvious.... II therefore conclude
conclude that the
serious, if not always as immediately obvious....
public schools may ban speech advocating illegal drug use. But 1I regard such
permits. 5S33
Amendment pennits.
what the
of what
the far
at the
standing at
as standing
regulation as
far reaches
reaches of
the First
First Amendment

48.
49.
50.

51.
51.
52.
53.

675, 683 (1986).
(1986).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,683
260, 271 (1988).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271
Hazelwood
(1988).
Id. at 272.
Id.
See id.
id.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
Morse,
Id. at 425 (Alito, l,
J., concurring)
Id.
concurring) (citation omitted).
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Compared to the
the protective
protective function
function of student-speech restrictions,
restrictions, the educational
educational
Compared
function ofthe
of the restrictions
restrictions has
has been
been aa secondary
secondary but
but still
still significant theme.
theme. Particularly
Particularly
function
in Fraser
Fraserand
andHazelwood,
Hazelwood,the
the Supreme Court indicated that speech
speech restrictions could
in
appropriately be
be used
used to educate the
the student
student speaker
speaker as well as other students.
students. Such
Such
appropriately
lessons might
might relate
relate either
either to general civility or to specific
specific coursework. The Fraser
Fraser
lessons
Court repeatedly
repeatedly emphasized
emphasized schools'
schools' roles
roles in
in teaching
teaching students about
about appropriate
Court
behavior, stating
stating that "schools
"schools must teach by example
example the
the shared
shared values
values of a civilized
behavior,
social order.,,54
order." 54 The
The Court explained
explained that
that "older
"older students .. .. .. demonstrate the
the
social
appropriate form of
of civil discourse
discourse and
and political expression
expression by
by their conduct
conduct and
appropriate
and
deportment in and
and out of
of class" and that schools transmit "essential
"essential lessons of civil,
deportment
conduct."55 The Court characterized
characterized the school's advance discouragement and
mature conduct."ss
as fulfilling
fulfilling this educational
educational function with
with
subsequent punishment of Fraser's speech as
respect
to
both
Fraser
and
the
students
who
had
sat
in
the
audience
for
his
speech.
The
respect to both Fraser
who had sat
for
school had first attempted to teach decorum by "prohibit[ing] the
the use of vulgar and
discourse," 56 and the teachers'
teachers' advance admonitions
admonitions to Fraser
offensive terms in public discourse,,,s6
about
his
speech
comported
with
that
message.
Once
Fraser
delivered
about
delivered the speech, the
Court reasoned, the school justifiably
punished
him
in
order
to "make the point to
justifiably
pupils that vulgar
vulgar speech and lewd conduct 57is wholly inconsistent with the
education."
school education."S?
public school
of public
values' of
'fundamental values'
'fundamental
In Hazelwood,
Hazelwood,the Court returned
to
returned this educative
educative theme, stating that educators
educators can
legitimately
restrict
school-sponsored
speech
in order to "assure
"assure that participants learn
legitimately
school-sponsored
whatever
lessons the
the activity
activity is
designed to teach" and to communicate
of
whatever lessons
is designed
communicate disapproval of
"speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched,
"speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched,
audiences., 58
immature audiences."s8
for immature
unsuitable for
or unsuitable
or profane,
biased or prejudiced,
prejudiced, vulgar
vulgar or
profane, or
Indeed,
HazelwoodCourt
Court recast
recast the principal's actions as stemming from the belief
belief
Indeed, the Hazelwood
that
[T]he
who had
had written
edited these
these articles had not sufficiently
[T]he students
students who
written and edited
sufficiently
mastered
the Journalism
curriculum that pertained
mastered .... .portions
. portions of
of the
Journalism II
II curriculum
pertained to the
treatment
treatment of
of controversial
controversial issues and
and personal attacks,
attacks, the need
need to protect
protect the
privacy
intimate concerns
privacy of
of individuals
individuals whose
whose most
most intimate
concerns are to be revealed in the
newspaper,
joumalists
newspaper, and "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions
restrictions imposed
imposed upon
uponjoumalists
59
s9
and readers.
includes adolescent
that includes
within [a] school
school community"
community" that
adolescent subjects
subjects and
readers.
In
the articles had provided
In the
the Court's
Court's view,
view, therefore,
therefore, the
the suppression
suppression of
ofthe
provided the
the student
student
journalists
journalists with a curricular
curricular lesson.
These protective
protective and educative
educative justifications
justifications for reducing
reducing students'
students' speech
speech rights
rights
are
are aa useful
useful lens
lens for evaluating
evaluating how such
such reductions
reductions should
should actually
actually occur. Both
Both
justifications
justifications are
are consistent
consistent with speech
speech restrictions
restrictions that take
take the
the form of
of speech
speech
suppression.
suppression. From
From a protection
protection rationale,
rationale, the basic
basic goal is to shield other
other students and
and
the
the school
school environment
environment from being
being exposed
exposed to
to the harmful
harmful speech
speech in the
the first
first place.
place.

54.
54.
55.
55.
56.
56.
57.
57.
58.
58.
59.
59.

Bethel
683 (1986).
Bethel Sch.
Sch. Dist.
Dist. No.
No. 403
403 v.
v. Fraser,
Fraser, 478 U.S.
U.S. 675,
675,683
(1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
[d. at 685-86.
685-86.
Hazelwood
Hazelwood Sch.
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
Kuhlmeier, 484
484 U.S.
U.S. 260,
260, 271
271 (1988).
(1988).
Id.
[d. at
at 276.
276.
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And, should the speech occur before the school is able to prevent
prevent it, the protection
rationale
rationale similarly points toward allowing the school to suppress it as soon as possible
in order to limit the damage.
damage.
The educational
consistent with speech
If the point is
educational rationale is also consistent
speech suppression. Ifthe
to teach students to speak civilly or (in
(in the context
school-sponsored speech)
context of school-sponsored
speech) to
speak
speak in a way that comports with a particular curricular
curricular lesson, then restricting
restricting student
speech
speech that does not meet that standard
standard and guiding students toward appropriate
appropriate ways
of expressing themselves at school both educates the student speaker
speaker and prevents
other
inappropriate examples. Of course, if the
other students from being exposed to inappropriate
substance
Fraser,Hazelwood,
Hazelwood, or Morse
substance of the speech
speech does not meet the Tinker,
Tinker, Fraser,
standards
standards for speech
speech restriction, then it cannot be restricted at all. But if it does,
suppressing that speech
speech is a logical
logical way to do so.
By contrast, the protective and educational
educational rationales are far less convincing
convincing when
when
the speech
speech restriction
restriction solely takes the form of after-the-fact
after-the-fact punishment,
punishment, without any
prior attempt at speech suppression.
suppression. Certainly, if the school has already tried to
disobeyed that
suppress the speech
speech on legitimate
legitimate grounds and the student speaker has disobeyed
appropriate, provided that it is not wholly disproportionate
disproportionate
warning, then punishment is appropriate,
to the offense. Schools are entitled
speaker
entitled to enforce
enforce their rules. But if the student
student speaker
never
never received adequate prior notice that his speech was prohibited, it is largely
largely
inconsistent with the protective
educational rationales
inconsistent
protective and educational
rationales to punish him as opposed to
"harmful" speech. Indeed, when such punishment
simply suppressing
suppressing his "harmful"
punishment occurs,
occurs, the
basic
framework-that student
basic compromise underlying
underlying the Court's student-speech
student-speech framework-that
speech rights can be limited to allow schools to fulfill their protective and educative
functions-falls out of balance.
turn back
Morse hypothetical
To illustrate this, it is helpful to tum
back to the Morse
hypothetical described
described
above. Imagine,
Imagine, once again, that there was no applicable school rule prohibiting
prohibiting
JESUS" banner at the torch rally, but that the principal
Frederick's "BONG
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
nonetheless immediately suspended Frederick
Frederick without first giving him the opportunity
to take it down on his own. As compared to simply suppressing Frederick's banner,
such a suspension
suspension would serve no additional protective
protective or educative
educative function. From a
Frederick would have
protection standpoint, the students standing
standing near Frederick
have already seen the
Suspending Frederick from school, as opposed
banner. Suspending
opposed to merely ordering
ordering him to take
he did not comply), would do nothing to erase
the banner down (and punishing him if
ifhe
erase
or reduce that exposure.
exposure. School officials could certainly
certainly speak to students to convey
disapproval of
the banner's message and thus attempt
"dangerous" impact.
disapproval
ofthe
attempt to reduce its "dangerous"
Moreover, going forward, the school might choose to adopt
adopt a policy of prohibiting
expression and to provide a basis for
advocacy of illegal drug use, both to deter such expression
punishing students
students who disobey that rule. But it is difficult to see how punishing
hypothetical, had no notice that his banner was
Frederick, who, for purposes of our hypothetical,
60
prohibited, would protect anyone. 60
Similarly, such punishment would serve no

60. One potential
other
potential argument is that this sort of notice-free
notice-free punishment
punishment would scare other
students, who would observe
of being punished even for speech that they did not
observe the potential ofbeing
know was prohibited
chances with their speech in
know
prohibited and would thus be deterred from taking any chances
the future.
discussed further
further below, however,
however, I believe
believe that
that this fails
fails to
to strike an appropriate
appropriate
the
future. As
As discussed
balance
between protecting
student expression
expression and deterring
balance between
protecting student
deterring "dangerous"
"dangerous" speech, given the
potential for overdeterrence. See infra Part II.B. To the extent that the specter
of punishment is
is
specter ofpunishment
used to
to deter
deter certain
certain types
types of
of speech,
such punishment
should be grounded on a policy that
speech, such
punishment should
used
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educational
banner
accomplished merely by suppressing the banner
educational purpose
purpose that could not be accomplished
and explaining
explaining to students
students why such speech would be prohibited
prohibited from now on.
Of course,
course, in the actual Morse
Morse case, Frederick did have such notice, given that the
school had already adopted such a policy. And notably, the relatively brief Morse
Morse
majority
majority opinion mentioned
mentioned this policy no less than five separate times, including in the
first and last paragraphs. The opinion's second sentence stated: "Consistent with
established
established school policy prohibiting such messages at school
school events, the principal
principal
6
directed
students to take down the banner."
' Its penultimate
directed the students
banner.,,61
penultimate sentence
sentence echoed:
It was reasonable for [the principal]
principal] to conclude
conclude that the banner promoted illegal
drug use-in violation
of
established
school
policy-andthat failing to act would
violation establishedschoolpolicy-and
would
send a powerful
message
to
the
students
in
her
charge, including
powerful
including Frederick, about
about
62
how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.62
The Court thus seems
recognized that in the absence
any notice on
seems to have implicitly recognized
absence of
ofany
on
Frederick's
part
that
his
banner
was
prohibited,
this
would
have
been
a
qualitatively
Frederick's
qualitatively
different
different case.
B. Encroachment
Encroachmenton First
B.
First Amendment
Amendment Rights
In addition to being inconsistent
the Supreme
Supreme
inconsistent with the theoretical
theoretical underpinnings
underpinnings of
ofthe
Court's student-speech
framework,
punishment
that
is
excessive
or
not
supported
student-speech
supported by
prior
adequate
notice
also
imposes
a
heightened
burden
on
students'
First
Amendment
prior adequate
students'
Amendment
rights. Particularly given the current
uncertainty
surrounding
schools'
jurisdiction
over
current
surrounding schools'
over
off-campus student speech, as well as some schools'
experimentation with new
new
off-campus
schools' current experimentation
disciplinary regimes, the potential for such punishment threatens to deter an even wider
wider
swath of student speech than that which should actually be restricted.
Several
challenged the presumption
Several scholars have challenged
presumption that prior restraints
restraints are always
more injurious to free expression than ex post sanctions. As Ariel Bendor writes, "[t]he
"[tjhe
of criminal and civil sanctions
self-censorship of
desirable
deterrent effect
effect ofcriminal
sanctions may lead to self-censorship
ofdesirable
restraints." 63 Prior restraints, after
speech that is broader
broader than that caused
caused by prior restraints.,,63
after all,
make clear
clear to the speaker precisely
precisely which
which speech is being restricted. The speaker, in
turn, has a concrete
concrete prohibition against which he can then mount a legal challenge.
challenge. By
By
after-the-fact punishments,
contrast, a regime that operates solely through after-the-fact
punishments, without
advance speech
speech restrictions, forces speakers to take an undefined risk.
This is particularly true in the student-speech
student-speech context, where the speakers are
younger and their First Amendment
Amendment rights are already
already less clear and robust. As a preHazelwood student note analyzing Tinker's
Tinker's application to school newspapers
newspapers observed:

gives students
students adequate notice
notice of what speech to avoid, so that they can be deterred to the
appropriate
appropriate extent.
61. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
393, 393 (2007)
61.
(2007) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
62. Id.
Id at 410 (emphasis
(emphasis added).
supra note 7, at 16 ("[I]t might
63. Bendor, supra
supra note 7, at 330; see also,
also. e.g.,
e.g., Scordato, supra
current doctrine of prior restraint has it exactly backward....
backward.... [T]here is good
appear that the current
reason
to suspect
suspect that
sanctions will
chilling effect
that reaches
reaches substantially
substantially
reason to
that subsequent
subsequent sanctions
will create
create aa chilling
effect that
more constitutionally
constitutionally protected
protected speech than will laws in the form of prior restraints.").
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'chilling effect':
Postpublication review can have a 'chilling
effect': a student wishing to address a
controversial topic might be unwilling to express herself if she thinks her
of
expression might subject her to sanctions....
sanctions.... A
A properly functioning
functioning system of
prior submission, unlike a properly functioning system ofsubsequent
of subsequent punishment,
student
would allow school officials to pass on the potential disruptiveness
disruptiveness of student
expression before the student risked sanctions,
sanctions, approving the close cases
cases in
publication of
protected expression
advance and thus encouraging
the publication
ofprotected
expression that comes
64
borderline. 64
close to the
the borderline.

The note's assumption that Tinker's substantial-disruption/invasion-of-rights
substantial-disruption/invasion-of-rights prongs
would apply to the regulation ofschool
of school newspapers ultimately proved
proved inaccurate, given
the Court's
Hazelwood
decision,
which
announced
a
new
standard for schoolCourt's
announced
sponsored publications.
sponsored
publications. But its underlying
underlying point remains valid. Indeed, the increasing
increasing
complexity of the student-speech landscape means that students are more likely than
ever before to be uncertain about the extent of their First Amendment protection.
Consider, for instance, the case
of Avery Doninger. In spring
case ofAvery
spring 2007, Doninger was
65
Connecticut. 65
in Burlington,
School in
High School
S. Mills
the Junior Class Secretary
Secretary at Lewis
Lewis S.
Mills High
Burlington, Connecticut.
coordinated Jamfest, a "Battle
As part of her Student Council work, Doninger coordinated
"Battle of the
66
Bands" concert
school.66
Jamfest
Bands"
concert held at the high school.
Jamfest was originally scheduled
scheduled to take
responsible
place on April 28, in the high school auditorium.
auditorium. 67 But when the teacher responsible
for working the lighting and sound systems
systems in the auditorium
auditorium became unavailable on
principal decided that either
that date, the principal
either the date or the venue would have to be
policy. 68 Frustrated, Doninger and several other
changed, in accordance
accordance with school policy.68
Student
Student Council members sent an e-mail from the school computer
computer lab to community
community
members
in
members telling them that administrators had decided
decided that Jamfest
Jamfest could
could not occur in
69
69
the auditorium and asking them to contact the central
office
to
complain.
Later
that
central
day, the principal
principal reprimanded
reprimanded the students, telling them that they were not acting
appropriately
appropriately as class officers
officers and that using the school computer system to send a
70
personal e-mail violated the school's Internet policy.
policy.7o
That night at home,
home, Doninger
Doninger
posted the following entry to her publicly accessible livejoumal.com
blog:
livejoumal.com
office..,
Jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office
... basically, because we
sent [the original Jamfest e-mail out], Paula Schwartz [the superintendent]
superintendent] is
getting a TON of
phone calls and e-mails
... however, she got pissed off
off
ofphone
e-rnails and such ...
.... 71
all together
thing all
the whole
and decided
decided to just
just cancel
cancel the
whole thing
together....
71

of the High
High School Press,
Press,83 MICH.
625,636
64. Note, Administrative
Administrative Regulation
Regulation ofthe
MICH. L. REv. 625,636
(1984).
(1984).
65. Doningerv.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199,203
199, 203 (D. Conn. 2007), aft'd,
41 (2d
aff'd, 527 F.3d
F.3d41
Cir. 2008).
Cir.2008).
66. Id.
Id.
67. Id.
Id.
68. Id,
Education policy
Id. Apparently, a Board of
ofEducation
policy required
required that this teacher be present for any
such event taking place in the school's new auditorium.
Id.
auditorium. Id.
69. Id.
Id. at 205.
205.
70. Id.
/d.
71. Id.
at206.
71.
Id. at
206.
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Doninger
Doninger also attached the e-mail that she and her fellow student council members had
sent out that morning, along with an e-mail that her mother had sent, so that readers
could "get an idea of what to write
if you want to write something or call [Ms.
72
more."
off
her
piss
to
Schwartz]
her offmore."n
The next day, Doninger
Doninger and her fellow student council members met with school
73
administrators and worked out a new date for Jamfest. 73
But several
several weeks later, the
Internet
superintendent's son came
came across Doninger's blog posting while using an Internet
74
search engine and showed the post to his mother, who passed
passed it along to the principal.
principal.74
When Doninger came to the principal's office to accept her nomination for Senior
Senior
confronted her with
Class Secretary, the principal
principal confronted
with the posting and asked her to
superintendent, show the blog entry
apologize to the superintendent,
entry to her mother, and withdraw
withdraw her
her
Secretary. 75 Doninger agreed to the first two conditions, but
candidacy for Senior Class Secretary.75
76 The principal then refused to provide an administrative
administrative
she balked at the third.76
77
office. 77
from running
her from
preventing her
thus preventing
candidacy, thus
Doninger's
for
endorsement
endorsement
candidacy,
running for
for office.
Asserting that
this "punishment did not fit the crime,"
crime," Doninger's mother filed suit on
on
78
her behalf.
behalf.78
Doninger's
academic
Doninger's case garnered
garnered widespread
widespread attention, generating
generating discussion
discussion in academic
commentary, the mainstream media, and the blogosphere.
blogosphere.7799 Aside from the
"douchebag" humor, most commentators focused on whether Doninger's high school
"douchebag"
had the authority
authority to punish her for speech that she had expressed
expressed at home on her
her
personal (albeit
(albeit publicly accessible)
accessible) blog.8800 Several decisions had already allowed
allowed
schools to punish
punish students
students for violent and threatening speech on their home
computers,8
computers,81 but the language here obviously presented a less dire situation.

72. Id.
Id.
id.
at 207.
73. See id.

74. Doninger
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41,46
41, 46 (2d Cir.
Cir. 2008).
2008).
74.
at 207.
207.
75. Doninger,
Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at
76. Id
Id.
77. Id
Id. at 207-08.
78. Id.
Id. at 202.
See, e.g., Mary-Rose
Speech Rights
Rights in the Digital
79. See.
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech
Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
1027, 1062-64
1062-64 (2008); Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM?
BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM?.Scrutinizing
Scrutinizing
REv. 1027,
Public
Cyberspeech Through
PersonalJurisdiction,
Jurisdiction,
Public SchoolAuthority
School Authority over Student Cyberspeech
Through the Lens of
ofPersonal
92 MINN.
1220-21(2008);
CourtHears
Conn. Teen's Appeal on School
92
MINN. L. REv. 1206,
1206, 1220-21
(2008); Appeals Court
Hears Conn.
Punishment,
GLOBE, Mar.
Mar. 5,
5, 2008;
2008; Arielle
Court Looks at Internet
Punishment, BOSTON
BOSTON GLOBE,
Arielle Levin Becker,
Becker, Court
Internet
Limits, HARTFORD
COuRATr, Mar. 5, 2008; Hassani
Court Backs HS Limit on Free
HARTFORD COURANT,
Hassani Gittens, Court
Free
Speech, N.Y. POST, May
May 30, 2008; Posting of Scott
Scott Moss to Prawfsblawg,
Prawfsblawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/07/students-should.html (July 17,2007,
12:40
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/07/students-should.html
17, 2007, 12:40
EST).
See, e.g.,
Papandrea, supra
80. See.
e.g., Papandrea,
supra note 79, at 1062-64.
81.
See, e.g., Wisniewski
of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that school
81. See.
Wisniewski v. Bd. ofEduc.,
could constitutionally
constitutionally punish student who had used an AOL Instant Messenger Icon that
depicted a pistol firing at a person's
representing spattered
person's head and dots representing
spattered blood, beneath which
were the words
words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen,"
an English
were
VanderMolen," an
English teacher);
teacher); J.S. v. Bethlehem
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that school could constitutionally
794 A.2d 936 (pa.
constitutionally punish student
student
who had
had created
at home
entitled "Teacher
"Teacher Sux,"
Sux," which
which featured,
featured, among
things,
who
created at
home aa website
website entitled
among other
other things,
a picture ofa
of a particular
particular teacher with her head cut offand
off and a request for $20
to
"help
pay
for the
$20 "help
hit man").
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Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, both the district court and the circuit
circuit court rejected
rejected Doninger's bid for
preliminary injunction. Essentially, what doomed Doninger
a preliminary
Doninger was that she had only
been
been prohibited from running for class office, as opposed to receiving a graver
punishment,
punishment, such
such as suspension. The district court, in fact, questioned whether the
basic
basic student-speech protections
protections even applied here. 82 Doninger "is
"is free to express her
her
administration and their decisions in any manner she
opinions about the school administration
83
wishes," the district court asserted. 83
"However, [she] does not have a First
Amendment right to run for a voluntary
extracurricular position as a student leader
leader
Amendment
voluntary extracurricular
while engaging in uncivil and offensive communications
communications regarding school
school
administrators." 84 In the alternative, the court ruled that if the basic student-speech
administrators.,,84
student-speech
school's
framework didapply,
did apply, then Fraser's
Fraser's "plainly
"plainly offensive"
offensive" standard justified the school's
off-campus speech,
actions. 8855 The court acknowledged
acknowledged that Fraser
Fraser had not involved off-campus
but asserted that the blog post was "purposely designed by [Doninger]
[Doninger] to come onto the
ofthe
related to school issues, and it was
campus,,,86
the blog was related
campus, '' s6 stating that "the content of
reasonably foreseeable that other LMHS
LMHS students would view the blog and that school
'87
administrators
This, in tum,
turn, rendered
administrators would become aware of it."
it.,,87
rendered the speech
speech
sufficiently "on-campus"
"on-campus" for purposes of Fraser.
sufficiently
Fraser.
somewhat different grounds.8888 Declining to
The Second Circuit affirmed, but on somewhat
Doninger's
reach the question of whether Fraser
Fraserapplied to off-campus
off-campus speech like Doninger's
disruption" prong to
to justify
Tinker's "substantial disruption"
blog, the Second Circuit instead used Tinker's
the school's actions. 89 The court noted that one of its recent precedents already
"reasonably foreseeable
foreseeable. .
recognized
recognized schools'
schools' regulatory authority over speech that was "reasonably
. .. [to] come to the attention of school authorities
authorities and [to] create a risk of substantial
90
91 Moreover, given the
disruption"
and concluded that this standard was met here. 91
disruption,,90
of the punishment, the court reasoned
"substantial
relatively
relatively minor nature ofthe
reasoned that Tinker's
Tinker's "substantial
92
disruption" test should be ratcheted
The school did not have to show
ratcheted down as well.92
that Doninger's blog posting had disrupted, or risked disrupting, classroom
classroom
of disruption typically required
performance,
performance, school safety, or school order-the
order-the types ofdisruption
by Tinker.
Tinker. Instead, it was enough for the school to show that Doninger's conduct
conduct risked

82. Doninger,
Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 213 ("[W]hether
("[W]hether Tinker or Fraser
Fraser provides
provides the
considering the school's actions in this case is far less clear.").
appropriate
appropriate framework for considering
83. Id.
Id. at 216.
84. Id.
Id.
85. Id.
Id. at 216-17.
86. Id.
Id. at 216.
87. Id.at217.
Id.
at 217.
88. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41,
41, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2008).
89. Id.
Id.
90. Id.
Id. at 50 (citing Wisniewski
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40
3~0 (2d Cir. 2007)).
91.
Id.
91. Id.
no small
small significance
significance
92.
Id. at
at 52
52 ("[T]he district court
court correctly
determined that
that it is
is of no
92. Id.
correctly determined
[Doninger's] extracurricular
extracurricular role as a student government
government
that the discipline here related to [Doninger's]
participation in voluntary,
leader. The district court found this significant
significant in part because
because participation
'privilege' that can be rescinded
rescinded when students fail to comply with
extracurricular activities is a 'privilege'
extracurricular
factor
the obligations inherent in the activities
activities themselves. We consider
consider the relevance
relevance of this factor
instead in the context of Tinker and its recognition
recognition that student expression may legitimately
legitimately be
'materially and substantially
regulated when school officials reasonably
reasonably conclude
conclude that it will 'materially
substantially
school."' (citations omitted)).
disrupt the work and discipline
discipline of the school.'"
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"disruption of efforts to settle the Jamfest dispute"
"frustration of the proper
dispute" and "frustration
"disruption
of LMHS's student government
government and undermining of the values that student
operation ofLMHS's
93
extracurricular activity, is designed
Implicitly
government, as an extracurricular
designed to promote.,
promote.,,93
Implicitly
acknowledging that this represented
Tinker, the
acknowledging
represented a significantly diluted version of Tinker,
Second Circuit concluded
"we have no occasion to consider
concluded that ''we
consider whether a different,
disqualification from student office would raise
more serious consequence
consequence than disqualification
constitutional
constitutional concerns.,,94
concems." 94
Doninger's case is not extremely
extremely sympathetic.
sympathetic. Being disqualified from running for
for
Class Secretary
Secretary for calling school administrators
"douchebags" on a blog certainly
certainly
administrators "douchebags"
differs from being suspended for wearing an armband to protest
protest a war. Nonetheless,
Doningerdecision are troubling.
two aspects of the Doninger
Doningeronly adds to the growing
schools' reach
First, Doninger
growing uncertainty surrounding schools'
over students'
students' Internet speech. As Mary-Rose Papandrea
Papandrea recently
recently described, courts
have adopted
approaches to this issue. While some courts have ruled that
adopted a variety
variety of approaches
schools
brought to
schools can
can only restrict
restrict or punish speech that the student speaker actually brought
campus,
campus, others
others have ruled that schools have jurisdiction
jurisdiction where it was "reasonably
"reasonably
foreseeable"
foreseeable" that the speech would come to campus, and still others have moved
immediately to applying Tinker's
Tinker's substantial-disruption
substantial-disruption test-which, ofcourse,
of course, can be
immediately
applied with varying levels ofstringency.95
of stringency. 95 In Doninger,
Doninger,the Second Circuit not only
only
endorsed
broadened the "reasonable
"reasonable foreseeability"
foreseeability" standard. The court
endorsed but also broadened
court
indicated that simply because Doninger had blogged about a high school
school event,
encouraged
contact
encouraged fellow students to respond to her message,
message, and urged students
students to contact
the administration, it was reasonably
reasonably foreseeable that her blog posting itself would
would
96
reach
approvingly quoted the district
reach school grounds. 96 Indeed, the Second Circuit approvingly
court's finding that the blog posting had been "purposely designed by [Doninger] to
come
campus." 97 But neither opinion cited any evidence that Doninger had
come onto campus.,,97
find out about
actually intended this result. In fact, school administrators
administrators did not even fmd
her posting until weeks later, when the superintendent's
superintendent's adult son happened
happened to come
across it on the Internet. A few sentences later, the Second Circuit used an even
broader
of this standard, suggesting that the test was not whether the blog
broader formulation
formulation ofthis
posting
posting was likely to physically
physically reach school grounds, but whether
whether "it
"it was reasonably
reasonably
foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog and that school
administrators
awareof
it."' 98 The Second Circuit's
administrators would become aware
ojit.,,98
Circuit's broad
broad construction
construction
"reasonable foreseeability"
of the "reasonable
foreseeability" test thus suggests that schools may possess
speech that relates to school issues and
jurisdiction over virtually
virtually all student Internet speech
and
tries to galvanize
galvanize student action. Such speech, after all, is likely to generate in-school
in-school
discussion that may reach
the ears of school
school administrators, who can search for that
99
Intemet. 99
the Internet.
speech on the

93.
Id.
93. [d.
94. [d.
Id. at 53.
95.
supra note 79, at 1056-71.
1056-71.
95. Papandrea, supra
96. Doninger,
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
97. [d.
Id. (quoting
199, 216 (D. Conn. 2007».
2007)).
(quoting Doninger v.
v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199,216
Id. (quoting Doninger,
98. [d.
Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 217) (emphasis added). Here, the Second
Second
Circuit again cited the district court's language, referring to the district court's "correct[]
"correct[]
determin[ation]."
Id.
deterrnin[ationJ." [d.
99. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to propose a standard regarding schools'
schools' authority
ofthis
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considerably expanded
schools' regulatory power over all
all
Second, Doninger considerably
expanded schools'
on-campus and off-campus-by
student speech-both
speech-both on-campus
off-campus-by indicating
indicating that Tinker's
substantial-disruption
substantial-disruption test should
should be considered relative
relative to the particular
particular punishment
punishment at
issue. Here, since the punishment
punishment was mere disqualification
disqualification from a student-government
student-government
office, it was enough to show that Doninger's
Doninger's blog posting had "risked...
"risked ... frustration
00
of the proper operation ofLMHS's
of LMHS's student government."l
This approach
ofthe
government." 100
approach echoes
echoes the
°
Sixth Circuit's recent
'' that where high school
EuverardlOl
recent conclusion in Lowery v. Euverard
Tinkerjustified
football players had signed a petition to have their football coach fired, Tinkerjustified
their dismissal from the team because the petition-in
petition-in undermining the coach's
coach's
morale-"was reasonably
authority and threatening
threatening morale-"was
reasonably likely to cause substantial
02
disruption" on the team. 1102
punishment
disruption"
Just as Doninger
Doninger stated that a more severe
severe punishment
might have yielded a different
different outcome, so too did the Lowery court emphasize that the
"regular education
students had not been suspended and that their "regular
education ha[d] not been
13
impeded."'
course, considerably
satisfy
impeded. ,,103
This approach, of
ofcourse,
considerably broadens schools'
schools' ability to satisfy
Tinker's substantial-disruption
Tinker's
substantial-disruption standard. It implies that if the student speech opposes
some aspect
of a school activity, the school-as long as the punishment
aspect ofa
punishment relates only to
the activity
speech's
activity in question--can
question--ean then justify its actions simply by pointing to the speech's
potential to interfere
interfere with that particular
course, will often be easyeasyparticular activity. This, of
ofcourse,
almost tautological-to
tautological-to show.
Taken
Taken together, these two implications
implications have the potential
potential to deter a tremendous
amount of student speech. If schools'
schools' authority
authority extends over all instances
instances of student
speech
speech regarding school activities, and if schools can exclude
exclude from those activities
activities
over students'
students' off-campus
off-campus speech-a topic that, as described above,
above, has generated
generated much
commentators, and the media. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning &
& Molly
discussion among courts, commentators,
C. Taylor, Morse
v. Frederick
andthe Regulation
of Student Speech, 35 HASTINGS
Morse v.
Frederick and
Regulation ofStudent
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
835 (2008);
Tinkering With Students' Rights:
Rights: The Need for
for an
an
(2008); Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering
EnhancedFirst
Student Internet
InternetSpeech, 36 CAP.
Enhanced
First Amendment Standard
Standard to Protect
Protect Off-Campus Student
U. L. REv. 129 (2007); Papandrea, supra
supranote 79; Brenton, supra
supranote 79; Erin Reeves, Note,
a Student":
Student": How to Analyze Student Speech in the Age ofthe
of the Internet,
The "Scope of
Internet,42 GA. L.
ofa
REV.
1127 (2008);
'Cyberbullying,'N.Y.
REv. 1127
(2008); Carmen
Carmen Gentile, Student Fights
Fights Record of
of'Cyberbu/lying,
'N.Y. TtMEs,
TIMEs, Feb.
7,
2009, at A20. Rather, as I discuss more fully below, my particular
7,2009,
particular focus is on the way in
which the current state of uncertainty on this issue heightens the need for more protection of
of
student speakers generally.
100. Doninger,
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 52.
101. 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
101.
102. Id.
Id. at 594. In so ruling, the Lowery court stated:
The success of an athletic
athletic team in large part depends on its coach. The coach
determines
'sets the tone' for the team....
determines the strategies and plays, and 'sets
team.... The ability
of the coach to lead is inextricably
inextricably linked
linked to his ability to maintain order and
and
discipline. Thus, attacking
of the coach necessarily
necessarily undermines
undermines his
attacking the authority
authority ofthe
ability to lead the team.
Id.; see also
also Wildman v. Marshalltown
Id.;
Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001)
2001) (upholding
(upholding
school's requirement
requirement that a high
high school sophomore who wrote a letter to her fellow teammates
teammates
criticizing
criticizing the basketball
basketball coach apologize in order to be allowed to remain on the team). The
Ninth Circuit, however, has held that a student's petition
petition opposing a basketball coach
coach can be
protected speech. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755,
protected
755, 760-62, 768-69 (9th Cir.
2006).
103. Lowery, 497 F.3d at
at 600.
600. The
The court
court added
added that
that the students
students "arefree
"arefree to continue
continue their
103.
campaign
to have Euverardfired.
they are
are not free
free to do is
is continue
continue to
to play
play football
football for
campaign to
Euverardfired. What they
him while actively
undermine his authority."
(emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis
original).
actively working to undermine
authority." Id.
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students who express opposition
opposition to the way they are being run, students are unlikely
unlikely to
expressing such views in any forum. Of course, it is possible to read
feel comfortable expressing
read
Doninger
Doninger less strongly, and as courts continue
continue to chart
chart their way in this area, the
the
standards are likely to evolve
students face an
standards
evolve over time. In the interim, however, students
increasingly
landscape and are likely to be justifiably
uncertain about the scope
increasingly murky landscape
justifiably uncertain
of their First Amendment protection.
speech-deterrent effect of this uncertainty
heightened by the current lack of
of
The speech-deterrent
uncertainty is heightened
any distinction between
between speech suppression and student punishment. Students
Students engaging
engaging
in speech that is close to the (moving) borderline
borderline are risking not only the suppression
of their speech itself,
itself, but also personal
personal punishment. This trend will only increase
increase if
if
other courts follow Doninger
and Lowery in holding that punishments falling short of
of
Doninger and
suspension
suspension should trigger less scrutiny. And, given some schools'
schools' recent
recent
experimentation
experimentation with new disciplinary regimes that center
center on participation
participation in
in
extracurricular
extracurricular activities,
activities, more courts are likely to face this very issue. An April 2008
New York Times article, for instance, described
described one New York middle school's new
policy of barring students from all aspects of extracurricular
extracurricular life if they had poor
poor
14
To be sure, the risk of being disqualified
disqualified from an
grades or "bad attitudes."'
attitudes."I04
extracurricular activity does not rise to the level of
being suspended, and some students
ofbeing
extracurricular
may be undeterred by the possibility of such consequences. But given the significant
significant
05
extracurricular activities play in many students'
students' lives,1
role that extracurricular
lives,105
many students
students may
well be chilled by that possibility.
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected
Doningerthe notion that
rejected in Doninger
after-the-fact punishments should trigger any additional inquiry. The court stated that
after-the-fact
"instances of prior restraint, where school
the same standards applied both to "instances
authorities prohibit or limit expression
expression before publication,
publication, and to cases like this one,
where [Doninger's]
disqualification
from
student
office followed as a consequence
consequence of
[Doninger's] disqualification
of
students."' 0 6 (Indeed,
the post she had already made available to other students."lo6
(Indeed, if anything, the
Doninger
punishments can
Doninger decision
decision implied that post hoc punishments
can arguably trigger less
scrutiny, at least when they fall short of
suspension.)
The
thus failed to recognize
court
ofsuspension.)

Rule for Pupils
Trouble: No Fun,
Fun, N.Y. TIMES,
104. Winnie Hu, School's New Rule/or
Pupils in Trouble:
TIMES, April 4,
2008, at Al.
AI.
105. In a different
different legal context, Justice Ginsburg-citing
Ginsburg-eiting a brief from the American
American
Academy
Pediatrics-described at length
length the
the significance
of students'
students' participation in
in
of Pediatrics-described
significance of
Academy of
extracurricular activities:
extracurricular
While extracurricular
extracurricular activities are 'voluntary'
'voluntary' in the sense that they are not
required
educational program....
required for graduation, they are part of the school's educational
program....
Participation
in
Participation in such activities
activities is a key component of school life, essential
essential in
reality for students applying to college, and for all participants, a significant
significant
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational
educational experience. Students
'volunteer' for
for extracurricular
in the
the same
same way
'volunteer'
extracurricular pursuits
pursuits in
way they
they might volunteer for
honors classes: They subject themselves to additional requirements, but they do so
inorder to
to take full
full advantage
advantage of the education offered them.
in
Bd. of
Educ. v. Earls,
Earls, 536
536 U.S. 822,
845-46 (2002)
(citation omitted); see
see also Santa Fe Indep.
Bd.
ofEduc.
822, 845-46
(2002) (citation
importance to many students of
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (noting "the
"the importance
of
attending and participating
participating in extracurricular activities as part of a complete
complete educational
educational
experience"). For further
further discussion of Earls
Earls and
and Santa
Fe, see infra
infra text accompanying
Santa Fe,
accompanying notes
experience").
120-26.
106.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41,52
41, 52 &
106. Doninger
& n.3 (2d Cir. 2008).
2008).
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students'
heightened burden that the specter
the heightened
specter of post hoc punishment imposes
imposes on students'
Amendment interests. The Seventh Circuit has also implicitly rejected any
First Amendment
07
Only a Ninth
cases.'107
student-punishment cases.
speech-suppression and student-punishment
distinction between
between speech-suppression
Circuit dissent has suggested, albeit without any detailed discussion, that the Supreme
Court's student-speech
student-speech framework justifies
justifies only speech suppression
suppression and that additional
notice"--is required in
protection-that is, advance "clear notice"-is
protection-that
in the context of student
10
punishment. 108
C. Due Process
Process Concerns
Concerns
After-the-fact
After-the-fact punishments
punishments of student
student speakers without adequate
adequate prior notice also
raise due process concerns. As discussed above, the Supreme Court itself implied
implied in
schools' ability to punish
Fraser
Fraser that the Due Process Clause places limits on schools'
punish students
for their speech. In response
response to Fraser's
Fraser's due process argument, the Court stated that
sanctions for a wide range
"[g]iven
"[g]iven the school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions
of the educational
educational process, the school disciplinary
of
unanticipated conduct disruptive ofthe
ofunanticipated
disciplinary
sanctions,"' 1 9
criminal sanctions,,,I09
imposes criminal
criminal code
as aa criminal
detailedas
as detailed
rules need not be as
code which
which imposes
and that the school rule against obscene
obscene language, combined
combined with the advance
that his lewd speech
adequate
warning
to
the teachers, "gave
warnings
warnings of
of[he
"gave
adequate
warning
Fraser
speech could
could
°
Thus, although the majority obviously disagreed with
subject him to sanctions. ' 0l
subject him to sanctions."lIo Thus, although the majority obviously disagreed with

notice,"' the Court
Justice
Justice Stevens's view that Fraser had received insufficient notice,1I1
Court did
advance warning
imply that schools must provide students
students with at least some degree of
ofadvance
before punishing them for their speech.
Fraserinvolved
Some
Some might argue that Fraser
involved a suspension
suspension and that, at least where lesser
punishments are imposed against student speakers-like
punishments
speakers-like the exclusion from student
office in Doninger-no
Doninger-no due process interests are implicated. This position
position has some
surface appeal. After all, the one case in which the Supreme
Supreme Court recognized students'
LopezIl122-involved
-involved a school
procedural due process rights-the 1975 case of Goss v. Lopez
procedural
suspension. There, the Court held that a student facing a temporary suspension
suspension was
if he denies them, an
of the charges against him and, ifhe
entitled to "oral or written notice ofthe
opportunity to present
explanation
the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity
explanation of
ofthe
present his side
14
' 13
Wright'l14
of
the story.
story.",,113
ofthe
Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected
rejected in Ingraham
Ingraham v. Wright
the
argument that students were entitled
entitled to the same procedural
procedural due process protections
prior to the imposition of corporal
corporal punishment. II1 S5 Since then, many federal and state

828 (7th Cir. 1998).
Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821,
107. Boucherv.
821,828
J., dissenting
719, 727 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kleinfeld, 1.,
108. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719,727
108.
Tinker, Fraser,
Fraser,and Hazelwoodrequire students
from denial ofrehearing
of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Tinker,
punished" and that absent
to receive "clear notice that the speech was prohibited
prohibited and would be punished"
such notice, a school can only tell the student "not to circulate [the speech] any more in school,
he [does]").
[does]").
and then punish him if
ifhe
(1986) (emphasis added).
109. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)
110. Id.
Id,(emphasis
1l0.
(emphasis added).
J., dissenting).
111. Id.
Id.at 695 (Stevens,
Ill.
(Stevens, 1.,
(1975).
112. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
at581.
113. Id.
Id. at
581.
(1977).
114. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
115. Id.
Id. at 672-82. The Ingraham
Ingraham Court asserted
asserted that corporal punishment, unlike school
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concluded that students lack any sort of liberty or property interest in
courts have concluded
participating
participating in extracurricular
extracurricular activities and that they are therefore not entitled
entitled to any
sort of notice or hearing before being removed
removed from those activities. 116 In fact, the
Doninger
Doninger district court-both in its original rejection of Doninger's bid for a
preliminary injunction
meritsinjunction and in its subsequent
subsequent decision on the underlying
underlying meritsreferred specifically
to
this
line
of
cases
in
concluding
that
Doninger's
disqualification
specifically
ofcases
disqualification
class-secretary position
from running for the class-secretary
position was
was permissible.'
permissible. I 17
17
That students lack independent
participation in
independent liberty or property
property interests in their participation
in
extracurricular activities, however, should not end the analysis. When such
extracurricular
participation is used as a lever for limiting student speech, a different sort of due
concern is raised. The crucial type of notice
process concern
notice is not information about the
particular
himself, as was at
particular charges
charges pending against the student
student so that he may defend himself,
Goss. Rather, it is an earlier
issue in Goss.
earlier form of notice: adequate notice of what the
applicable rules are in the first place. As Justice Stevens explained
Fraser
applicable
explained in his Fraser
implicated here.
here.'I IS Even if
if
dissent, a hybrid First Amendment/due
Amendment/due process interest
interest is implicated
suspensions,
state-created property interest in public education,"
education," id.
id. at
suspensions, did not implicate "the state-created
674 n.43, and that the available postpunishment
alleging
postpunishment remedies,
remedies, such as tort lawsuits alleging
excessive punishment, provided the required level of due process, id.
id.
at 675-82.
excessive
05-4092, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38070, at *5
*5
116. See, e.g.,
e.g., A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 05-4092,2005
(C.D. Ill. Dec. 28,
"courts in other jurisdictions
28, 2005) (noting that "courts
jurisdictions have repeatedly held that
there is no protectable
protectable or liberty interest in participating
participating in interscholastic
interscholastic athletics"); Angstat v.
Mid-West
436,442
2003) ("[T)here
("[T]here is no constitutionally
Mid-West Sch. Dist., 286 F. Supp. 2d 436,
442 (M.D. Pa. 2003)
constitutionally
protected
.... [M]any
[M] any courts that have considered the question have
protected interest in playing sports
sports....
is no clearly
extracurricular
found that there is
clearly established
established right to compete
compete or participate
participate in extracurricular
408-09 (D.N.J. 1988)
1988) ("New Jersey is not
activities."); Palmer v. Merluzzi,
Merluzzi, 689 F. Supp. 400, 408--Q9
not
alone in recognizing
recognizing that students do not have a federally protected property
property interest
interest in
extracurricular
extracurricular activities. The great majority
majority of state and federal courts which have considered
this issue have reached a similar conclusion.").
Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211,215 (D. Conn. 2009)
("The Court believed
117. Doninger v. Niehoff,
2009)("The
believed
Fraserbecause it did not arise from a suspension
that this case differed from both Tinker and Fraser
suspension or
discipline but rather involved participation
participation in voluntary, extracurricular
extracurricular
other similar student discipline
secretary.... The Court cited one treatise as noting that an
activities-namely, serving as class secretary....
'overwhelming majority
majority of
of both
and state
state courts
have held
'overwhelming
both federal
federal and
courts have
held that
that participation
participation in
extracurricular activities
activities..,
(citation
extracurricular
... is a privilege, not a right."'
right. '" (second omission in original) (citation
omitted)); Doninger v. Niehoff,
Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199,213-16
199, 213-16 (D. Conn. 2007) ("[N]either
("[N]either
omitted»;
Tinker nor Fraser
Fraser involved participation
participation in
in voluntary, extracurricular activities, and in other
contexts, the Supreme
Supreme Court and other courts have been
been willing to accord great discretion to
school officials in deciding whether students are eligible to participate
participate in extracurricular
extracurricular
activities .... [Doninger]
[Doninger] does not have a First Amendment right to run for a voluntary
activities....
extracurricular position as a student leader while engaging in uncivil and offensive
extracurricular
communications regarding
communications
regarding school administrators.").
118. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 691-92 (1986)
(1986) (Stevens,
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]f
("[I]f
the scope of
a student is to be punished for using offensive
offensive speech, he is entitled to fair notice of
ofthe
of
the prohibition
and the
consequences of
of his
free speech
speech protected
protected by
by
the
prohibition and
the consequences
his violation.
violation. The
The interest
interest in
in free
the First Amendment
and the interest
interest in fair
fair procedure
procedure protected
by the Due
Due Process
Process Clause
Clause of
the
Amendment and
protected by
of
the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment combine
combine to require this conclusion.");
conclusion."); see also,
City
the
also, e.g., Grayned
Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408
408 U.S.
U.S. 104,
104, 108
108 (1972)
("It is
is aa basic
basic principle
principle of
due process
process that
that an enactment
ofRockford,
(1972) ("It
ofdue
enactment
is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined....
defmed.... [B]ecause we assume that
man is
is free to
to steer between
between lawful
lawful and
and unlawful
unlawful conduct,
conduct, we
we insist
insist that
that laws
laws give
give the person of
man
of
intelligence a reasonable
reasonable opportunity
ordinary intelligence
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
act
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schools do not have to provide
provide notice
notice and
and aa hearing
hearing to every
every student
student cut from the
the band,
schools
other extracurricular
extracurricular activity,
activity, it does
does not follow that
that they can
can
football team, or other
necessarily exclude
exclude students
students from such activities
activities on
on the basis
basis of their speech without
without
necessarily
provided adequate
adequate notice
notice of this possibility.
having first provided
Indeed,
Indeed, an analogy can
can be drawn here to two fairly recent
recent Supreme
Supreme Court decisions
9
different school
school law context: Vernonia
District v. Acton
Acton 11
I 19 and Board
Board of
of
Vernonia School District
in a different
12o
120
Education
Education v. Earls.
Earls. In both Vernonia
Vernonia and Earls,
Earls, the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court analyzed
analyzed the
constitutionality of school policies that required all
all students participating
participating in various
constitutionality
interscholastic athletics
extracurricular activities
activities (respectively,
(respectively, interscholastic
athletics and all competitive
competitive
extracurricular
extracurricular activities)
activities) to submit to random
random drug testing. 121
121 In neither case
case did the
extracurricular
Court
Court hold that because
because extracurricular
extracurricular activities were
were a mere "privilege," the Fourth
unreasonable search
Amendment protections
protections against
against unreasonable
search and seizure
seizure did not apply. Rather,
Rather,
Amendment
the policies
Amendment analysis
the Court performed
performed a detailed Fourth Amendment
analysis of
ofthe
policies in
in question,
weighing
weighing the students'
students' legitimate
legitimate expectations
expectations of privacy
privacy and the character
character of the
the
122
issue. 122
at issue.
governmental concern
the governmental
intrusion against the nature and immediacy
immediacy of
of the
concern at
analysis, the Court
To be sure, in conducting this analysis,
Court took into account the voluntary
nature of these activities, along with the heightened
heightened regulations
regulations and reduced
reduced privacy
privacy
nature
23
The Court never
never suggested,
suggested, however, that
imposed. 123
that the activities already irnposed.1
accordingly.").
Karen Daly has drawn on Justice Stevens's
Stevens's Fraser
Fraser dissent in arguing that teachers
teachers are
are
sufficient notice
entitled to sufficient
notice before being punished for their classroom
classroom speech. She writes:
The link between the First Amendment's free speech protections and the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements
requirements is not always made explicit,
but judicial opinions make clear that the need for notice is heightened
heightened when
policies or regulations threaten to chill speech. One rationale for fair notice in the
[v. Bd
of
of Keyishian [v.
educational realm, exemplified by the sweeping language ofKeyishian
Bd. of
sufficient 'breathing
(1967)], is to provide sufficient
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)],
'breathing room' for the
Amendment freedoms realized through teacher speech.
valuable First Amendment
FirstAmendment, 30 J.L.
ClassroomSpeech
Speech and the First
BalancingAct: Teachers' Classroom
Karen C. Daly, Balancing
EDuC. I,
1, 20-21 (2001).
& Eouc.
(200 I).
of
The First Circuit has adopted a similar view, holding
holding that teachers have a "right to notice of
(1st Cir. 1993). In
prohibited." Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st
what classroom conduct is prohibited."
the same case, the First Circuit observed
observed that Hazelwood
Hazelwood covered only speech suppression,
suppression, and
retaliationmust
"[t]his suggests that the Court would agree
argued that "[t]his
agree that postpublication
postpublication retaliation
Ward,
Id. (emphasis in original). Both Daly's piece and Ward,
derive from some prior limitation." [d.
in
educational context
of the general educational
given their respective discussions ofthe
context and the approach taken in
involved the speech of students rather than teachers), thus implicitly
Hazelwood(which itself involved
Hazelwood
student speakers.
idea of recognizing a notice requirement when punishing student
support the idea
(1995).
119. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
822 (2002).
120. 536 U.S. 822
Vernonia, the names of all students participating in interscholastic athletics were
121. In Vernonia,
121.
selected for drug
placed into a "pool"; each week, ten percent of the students were randomly selected
at 650. In Earls,
testing of their urine. 515 U.S. at
Earls, all middle- and high-school students
in
extracurricular activities had to agree to submit to random drug testing; in
participating in extracurricular
extracurricular activities (including the
practice, the policy was applied only to competitive extracurricular
choir, porn
pom
band, choir,
of America, band,
of America, Future Homemakers ofAmerica,
Academic Team, Future Farmers ofAmerica,
826.
cheerleading, and
and athletics). 536 U.S. at 826.
poms, cheerleading,
at 828-38.
Earls, 536 U.S. at
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-65; Earls,
122. Vernonia,
student-athletes have reduced
for instance, the Court stated that student-athletes
Vernonia, for
123. In Vernonia,
and showers)
rooms and
public-school locker rooms
nature of public-school
expectations of limited privacy (given the nature
expectations
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because students
students could avoid the drug testing regimes simply by choosing not to
participate
Amendment was no longer
participate in the activities
activities in question, the Fourth Amendment
longer
applicable.
The Court adopted a similar approach in Santa
Santa Fe Independent
Independent School District
District v.
24
Doe,'
which involved
district's
Doe,124
involved an Establishment Clause challenge
challenge to a school district's
25
practice
practice of student-led
student-led prayer at high school football games. 1125
The Court rejected the
district court's argument that there was no Establishment
Establishment Clause violation because
attendance at these football games was merely voluntary, explaining:
attendance

Attendance
is
Attendance at a high school football game, unlike showing up for class, is
certainly
certainly not required in order to receive a diploma....
diploma....
importance to many students of attending
attending
....
. . The District also minimizes the importance
extracurricular activities
and participating in extracurricular
activities as part of a complete educational
experience.... To assert that high school students do not feel immense
experience....
immense social
pressure,
extracurricular event
event
pressure, or have a truly genuine
genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular
extreme." ....
that is American
American high school football is "formalistic
"formalistic in the extreme."
. .
Undoubtedly, the games are not important to some students, and they voluntarily
voluntarily
attending
choose not to attend. For many others, however, the choice between attending
these games and avoiding personally offensive religious rituals is in no practical
sense an easy one. The Constitution,
Constitution, moreover, demands that the school
school may not
126
....
students ....
upon these
choice upon
force this difficult choice
these students
126
extracurricular activities does not dispose of the
Just as the voluntary
voluntary nature of extracurricular
potential for a Fourth
Amendment or Establishment Clause violation, neither does it
Fourth Amendment
negate the potential for a First Amendment/due
Amendment/due process violation. Indeed, even when
when
the only sanction
sanction for a student's speech
speech is removal from this sort of activity, that
student's
Amendment interests
concomitant due process interests are still
student's First Amendment
interests and concomitant
implicated. Only
implicated.
Only where the punishment
punishment is truly insignificant
insignificant should such claims
claims be
rejected. In judging whether
whether a student speaker's punishment
punishment is too de minimis to
warrant review, courts
courts can usefully draw on the judicially
judicially adopted standard
standard in the
context
context of public employees'
employees' First Amendment
Amendment claims: whether
whether the response to the
speech
"deter a similarly situated individual
speech in question
question was sufficiently
sufficiently adverse as to "deter

and that "[b]y
team,' they voluntarily subject themselves
"[b]y choosing to 'go out for the team,'
themselves to a degree
generally," given that they have to
of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally,"
submit to physical
physical examinations, maintain minimum grade point averages, and the like. 515 U.S.
Vernonia Court added that "[s]omewhat
at 657. The Vernonia
"[s]omewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
'closely
students who
who voluntarily
voluntarily participate
participate in school athletics have reason
'closely regulated
regulated industry,'
industry,' students

to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."
Id.
privacy." Id.
EarlsCourt observed that:
Similarly, the Earls
extracurricular activities voluntarily
voluntarily
competitive extracurricular
[S]tudents who participate in competitive

subject
of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes.
subject themselves to many ofthe
Some of
these clubs require occasional
occasional off-campus
ofthese
ofI-earnpus travel and communal undress,
and all of them have their own rules and requirements
requirements that do not apply to the
student body as a whole.
536 U.S. at 823.
124. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
125.
125. Id.
Id. at 294-99.
Id.at 311-12.
126. Id.
311-12.
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127
of
ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights.',
ofordinary
rights.,,127
In making this
assessment, courts should engage in a highly fact-specific inquiry, just as they do in the
128
In
employment
finds that the punishment at issue would
employment setting. 128
In cases where a court fmds
dissuade a similarly
similarly situated student from engaging
engaging in the speech
speech in question, the court
court
predicated on adequate prior
should proceed
proceed to consider
consider whether the punishment
punishment was predicated
notice and was substantively
substantively reasonable, as discussed in Part III.
Interestingly, some courts have implicitly recognized
recognized the significance of advance
notice in connection
of student speakers-at
speakers-at least insofar as they
they
connection with the punishment ofstudent
have specifically
specifically mentioned, in the course of upholding such punishments,
punishments, whatever
whatever
notice was given. As noted above, the Supreme
Fraseraddressed this issue,
Supreme Court
Court in Fraser
Morse Court also repeatedly
Frederick's
and the Morse
repeatedly noted the antidrug
antidrug school policy that Frederick's
129
Poling v.
v. Murphy,
the Sixth Circuit upheld the
speech violated. Similarly, in Poling
Murphy,129
discipline of a student who gave a crude campaign speech, stating at the end of the
opinion that the student had been "put on notice before he gave his speech
speech that it
of the student
considered important for the president
president ofthe
student council 'to
'to work in a cooperative
cooperative
way with the Administration'"
Administration' and was "specifically
"specifically told" that a particular statement
statement
130
was inappropriate. 130
(1) the
And even in Doninger
Doninger itself, the district court noted that (l)
high school's handbook "included language regarding the social and civic expectations
expectations
of students,,,131
students,"' 3'1 and (2)
(2) the high school principal
eprincipal had told Doninger
Doninger that her initial email from the school's computer
computer represented a failure "to act in a manner appropriate
132
of
to class officers."'
officers.,,132 The court added that the principal
principal "testified
''testified that a factor of
particular relevance
relevance in her disciplinary decision was the fact that Avery posted her blog
conversation occurred.,,133
occurred.' 33
entry on the very evening of the day on which that conversation
of holding that advance
advance notice is
Nonetheless, courts have generally
generally stopped short ofholding
required, 134 let alone
of
required,134
alone analyzing the further question of what the necessary level of

127. N.Y.
Officers Union
433 F.3d
F.3d 320,
320, 328
328 (2d Cir. 2006)
127.
N.Y. State
State Law
Law Officers
Union v. Andreucci,
Andreucci, 433
(quoting Washington
2004)) (internal
(quoting
Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir. 2004»
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
53, 68
68
quotation marks omitted); cf Burlington
(2006) (holding
(holding that
that Title
Title VII's antiretaliation provision
provision covers any employer action that aa
(2006)
"reasonable employee
employee would
[find] materially
materially adverse,
which in this
this context
context means
means itit well might
"reasonable
would [find]
adverse, which
supporting a charge of discrimination"
discrimination"
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
omitted».
& Santa
Santa Fe
Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 69 (explaining
"context
128. See Burlington
Burlington N.
N. &
(explaining that "context
matters," and that the significance
significance of a particular
of
particular act "often depends on a constellation of
matters,"
surrounding circumstances,
circumstances, expectations,
surrounding
expectations, and relationships," such that an "act
"act that would be
immaterial in
in some
some situations
situations is
others" (citations
omitted) (internal
(internal quotation
quotation marks
is material
material in others"
(citations omitted)
ommitted)).
ommitted».
Cit. 1989).
129. 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
130. Id.
Id. at 764.
131. Doningerv.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199,214
199, 214 (D. Conn. 2007).
13!.
2007).
at 205.
205.
132. Id.
/d. at
at 214.
214.
133. Id.
Id. at
134. As
As discussed
above, one notable
exception can
can be
be found in
in a 2002 Ninth
Ninth Circuit
134.
discussed above,
notable exception
Circuit
dissent. See supra
supratext accompanying
California
accompanying note 108. Additionally, the Central District of
ofCalifornia
recently held
held that
that a student's
student's due
due process
process rights
rights had indeed
indeed been violated
recently
violated when aa
off-campus speech even though the school's "written
''written policies
school suspended
suspended her for her off-campus
[had] not put
put students
students on notice
notice that
that off-campus speech
or conduct
conduct which
which cause[d]
cause[d] a disruption
speech or
to school activities [might] subject them to discipline."
discipline." J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist.,
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be. Instead, they
they simply
simply describe what notice (ifany)
notice would be.
(if any) was given and then
refer to that notice for rhetorical effect. This approach provides insufficient protection
refer
to student speakers,
speakers, leaving
leaving open the possibility ofpunishment
of punishment even in the absence of
of
adequate
adequate notice.
Thus, in Part III, I describe the two additional protections that are necessary
necessary to
protect the constitutional interests of student speakers who face punishment for their
speech: first,
first, the student speaker must have received adequate
speech:
adequate prior notice that the
speech was prohibited; second, the ultimate punishment must itself be reasonable.
III. THE
THE NECESSARY ADDmONAL
ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS:
PROTECTIONS: NOTICE AND REASONABLENESS
REASONABLENESS
As a starting point, of course, a student speaker should never face punishment
unless the speech at issue is itself suppressible under Tinker,
Tinker, Fraser,
Fraser,Hazelwood,
Hazelwood, or
Morse
(or,
of
course,
is
unprotected
by
the
First
Amendment
Morse
unprotected
Amendment altogether, as in the case
of true threats, defamation, incitement to imminent
imminent lawless action, and the like). My
My
proposed
proposed requirements of notice and reasonableness in no way replace the standards
created by those cases. Rather, they are additional
additionalprotections that should be triggered
when the school seeks not only to restrict the speech itself pursuant to the
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morseframework but also to punish the student speaker.
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
A. Adequate Prior
PriorNotice
What level of prior notice provides a sufficient predicate
predicate for the punishment
punishment of a
student speaker? Here, it is helpful to start with Fraser
Fraser and Morse,
Morse, given that in both
cases the Supreme
required noticeSupreme Court-while not prescribing
prescribing a specific level
level of
ofrequired
noticeupheld the punishments at issue, which had been preceded
preceded by some
some form of notice.
Thus, in order to complement
complement rather than contradict the existing
existing Supreme Court
Court
framework, this Article's formulation ofprior adequate notice must be satisfied by the
type of warnings that were given in Fraser
Fraserand Morse.
Morse.
Morse
is
an
easy
case.
Not
only
was
there
a
school
advocacy of
of
Morse
school rule prohibiting
prohibiting advocacy
illegal drug use,
but
the
principal
punished
Frederick
use,
Frederick only after she specifically
specifically ordered
him to take down his "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner, and he refused to do so (unlike
35
his fellow students, who were not punished).'
punished). 135 It is difficult to imagine any definition
definition
of prior adequate
adequate notice
notice that would not be satisfied
satisfied there.
Fraser
Fraser is more interesting because of the divergence
divergence between
between the majority
majority and
Justice
Justice Stevens's
Stevens's dissent.
dissent. Without further discussion,
discussion, the majority
majority stated
stated that the
school's
"prespeech admonitions"
school's disciplinary
disciplinary rule and the
the teachers'
teachers' "prespeech
admonitions" provided
provided
"adequate
sanctions," thus
"adequate warning
warning to
to Fraser
Fraser that
that his
his lewd
lewd speech
speech could
could subject
subject him to sanctions,"
36
obviating
concems.'136
Justice
turn, clearly felt that
obviating any due process
process concerns.
Justice Stevens,
Stevens, in tum,
that a higher
higher
level
of
notice
was
required,
although
that standard
level ofnotice
required, although his own formulation
formulation of
ofthat
standard varied over
over
the course of
his dissent. Justice
ofhis
Justice Stevens began
began by stating
stating that before being
being punished, a
student
"'fairnotice of the scope
student speaker
speaker was entitled
entitled to "fair
scope of the prohibition and the
37
consequences
consequences of its violation."'
violation.,,137 He similarly
similarly stated that a student should
should not be
be

No. CV
2009).
CV 08-3824 SVW, slip
slip op. at
at 14
14 (C.D. Cal.
Cal. Dec. 8,
8,2009).
135.
135. Morse
Morse v.
v. Frederick,
Frederick, 551
551 U.S.
U.S. 393,
393, 398
398 (2007).
(2007).
136.
686 (1986).
675,686
(1986).
136. Bethel
Bethel Sch.
Sch. Dist.
Dist. No.
No. 403
403 v.
v. Fraser,
Fraser, 478
478 U.S.
U.S. 675,
137.
137. Id.
Id. at
at 691
691 (Stevens,
(Stevens, J.,
1., dissenting)
dissenting) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).

HeinOnline -- 85 Ind. L.J. 1136 2010

2010]

REGULATING STUDENT SPEECH
SPEECH
REGULATING

1137
1137

38
Later,
had no reason
reason to anticipate
anticipate punitive
punitive consequences."'
consequences.,,138
disciplined "if he had
however, his dissent
dissent raised
raised the
the bar, suggesting
suggesting that the question
question was whether
whether the
the Court
Court
could
assert that [the speaker]
speaker] must have known
known that the school
could "confidently assert
39
It was
administration would punish him"
him" for the speech.1
speech. 139
was under
under that
that latter
latter formulation
formulation
administration
concluded that adequate
that Justice
Justice Stevens
Stevens concluded
adequate notice had not been provided, asserting
asserting
he
unlikely" that
Fraser "would
''would have decided to deliver
deliver the speech
speech if
ifhe
that it was
was "highly
"highly unlikely"
that Fraser
had known
known that
that it would
would result in his suspension
suspension and
and disqualification
disqualification from delivering
delivering
"a strong presumption
the school
presumption 14in favor of free
school commencement
commencement address"
address" and that
that "a
arguable." 0
is arguable."I40
this kind
issue of
expression should apply
apply whenever
whenever an
an issue
ofthis
kind is
expression
standard-that the
Justice Stevens's ultimate formulation of
of the adequate-notice
the
adequate-notice standard-that
Justice
question
confident, even
even employing
employing a strong
strong presumption
presumption in favor
question is whether
whether a court is confident,
of free expression,
expression, that the particular
particular student
student speaker must have known that he would
be punished
speech-was so robust that it is not surprising
surprising that the Fraser
Fraser
punished for his speech-was
majority
majority implicitly rejected it. Indeed, there
there is room to move
move several notches
notches down
adequate protection on the
standard and still provide
from that standard
provide student speakers with adequate
notice front.
Cases addressing
addressing the need for adequate
adequate notice
notice in other First Amendment/due
Amendment/due
process contexts
Supreme Court
Court suggested in Grayned
contexts provide
provide useful guidance.
guidance. The Supreme
of ordinary
that the fundamental question is whether
whether the regulation
regulation "give[s]
"give[s] the person
person ofordinary
opportunity to know what is prohibited,
intelligence a reasonable
reasonable opportunity
prohibited, so that he may act
act
enforcement is prevented.14
prevented. 141 Lower
accordingly" and so that arbitrary
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement
accordingly"
courts have adapted this standard to noncriminal
Most relevantly,
relevantly, the
noncriminal sanctions as well. Most
sanctions for teacher
First Circuit, when applying this concept
ofsanctions
teacher speech,
concept to the context of
framed the test as follows:

[W]hile we acknowledge a First Amendment right of public school teachers to
proscribed, we do not hold that a school must expressly
know what conduct is proscribed,
inappropriate conduct by teachers. The relevant inquiry
prohibit every imaginable
imaginable inappropriate
of
is: based on existing
existing regulations, policies, discussions, and other forms of
communication between school administration and teachers, was it reasonable
communication
142 for
conduct was
her conduct
that her
know that
to know
the school to expect the teacher
teacher to
was prohibited?
prohibited?142
143

inquiries. 143
reasonableness-based inquiries.
adopted reasonableness-based
Other courts have likewise adopted
This approach is readily adaptable to the student-speech
student-speech context. It is also consistent
with the Fraser
Fraser majority's comment that schools need a certain
certain degree
degree of flexibility,
such that their disciplinary rules should not have to be as detailed as those contained in
Ward formulation, this Article
Circuit's Ward
a criminal code. Indeed, drawing on the First Circuit's
appropriate test is simply whether, given existing school regulations,
proposes that the appropriate

Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
138. [d.
Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
139. [d.
Id.
140. [d.
(1972).
141. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
141.
(1st Cir. 1993)
1993) (citation omitted).
142. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st
142.
Comm'n, 142
142
& Health Review Comm'n,
v. Fed.
Fed. Mine Safety &
Stillwater Mining Co. v.
See, e.g., Stillwater
143. See,
of a civil penalty imposed on a mining
in the context ofa
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1998)
1998) (holding, in
1179, 1182 (9th
F.3d 1179,
with the mining
reasonably prudent person familiar with
company, that the test was whether "a reasonably
of the standard would have recognized the specific
protective purposes of
industry and the protective
the standard").
prohibition or requirement of the
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policies,
school-student communication, a reasonable
ofschool-student
reasonable
policies, discussions,
discussions, and other forms of
student would have recognized
recognized that the speech in question
question (a) was subject to the
school's jurisdiction and (b) was prohibited. When these conditions are not met, the
itself(assuming that it can
of the speech itself(assuming
only potential option should be suppression ofthe
can be
suppressed at all), rather than any punishment of the student speaker. This approach
protects
schools' authority to
protects both student speakers and schools
schools by maintaining schools'
immediately react to potentially harmful speech (by suppressing it) while
immediately
simultaneously making sure that any actual punishment is predicated
predicated on prior adequate
simultaneously
notice.
1. Jurisdictional
1.
Jurisdictional Notice
Importantly,
distinct
Importantly, this formulation of adequate
adequate prior notice encompasses
encompasses two distinct
schools' jurisdiction over
components. First, given the current uncertainty
uncertainty regarding
regarding schools'
off-campus
(particularly cyber-speech),
cyber-speech), it is crucial
off-campus speech (particularly
crucial that any school seeking
seeking to
speech has clearly communicated
communicated this possibility
punish students for such speech
possibility to students.
Because different
approaches, different school
Because
different courts have adopted divergent approaches,
school districts
face varying upper limits in terms ofhow
of how far their jurisdiction
jurisdiction can extend. Some may
choose
exercise jurisdiction to the maximum extent authorized by the applicable
choose to exercise
governing
governing law; others may choose
choose to self-limit their jurisdiction
jurisdiction in one or more
respects. Within this range, schools may understandably follow an ad hoc approach
approach
depending
if schools are actually going to punish
depending on the particular speech
speech at issue. But ifschools
punish
students
adhoc
students for their speech, as opposed to simply
simply suppressing
suppressing the speech itself,
itself, an ad
approach
unacceptable. In order
Amendment and due process
approach is unacceptable.
order to protect the First Amendment
interests described
described above, schools need to inform students about the jurisdictional
jurisdictional
approach
approach that they are adopting, so that the students can make educated
educated judgments
about whether
whether and how to express their views.144
views. l44 In the absence of such notice, the
default presumption should be in favor of narrow jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, such that schools can
only punish students
students for speech
speech that they uttered while at school,
school, even when their
ability
ability to suppress
suppress student speech extends further.
Indeed, a troubling aspect of Doninger
Doninger is that, at least judging from the reported
decisions on the case, there was no school district regulation, policy, or other
communication putting students
students on notice that the school might exercise jurisdiction
jurisdiction
off-campus Internet
principal told
over their off-campus
Internet speech. Although the high school principal
school computer
computer system to send personal eDoninger that students could not use the school
between
mails and referred
referred generally
generally to the need for a cooperative
cooperative working relationship
relationship between
student council
council officers and the administration, neither
neither Doninger nor any other students
were informed that even their Internet
Internet speech
speech created
created at home could subject them to
school-based sanctions. (Interestingly, a February 2009 bill proposed by a Connecticut
school-based

144. As
As noted
noted above,
above, see
see supra
supranote 134,
134, a very
very recent
from the
the Central
Central District
District of
of
144.
recent decision
decision from
in
California employed precisely this logic in upholding a student's claim that the school, in
punishing her
her for
for her
her off-campus
off-campus speech, had violated her
her due
due process
J.C. v. Beverly
Beverly
punishing
process rights. J.C.
Hills Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-3824
8, 2009). The court reasoned
08-3824 SVW (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8,2009).
reasoned
that "[a]lthough
"[a]lthough the
the School can,
the bounds
bounds of the
the constitution,
constitution, regulate
off-campus
regulate off-campus
that
can, within the
speech
and substantial
substantial disruption
activities under Tinker,
Tinker, itit must
must
speech that causes aa material
material and
disruption to school activities
put students
students on notice ofsuch
of such authority
authority so
so that they can
conformity with
can modify
modify their conduct in conformity
put
school rules."
Id. at 14.
rules." Id.
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state legislator-in
legislator-in direct response
schools'
response to Doninger-would
Doninger-would significantly
significantly reduce schools'
authority
"from punishing students
authority in this respect, by prohibiting
prohibiting schools "from
students for the
content
correspondence transmitted outside of school facilities or with
content of electronic
electronic correspondence
school
equipment,
provided
such content is not a threat to students, personnel or the
school
145
school.,,145)
school."' )
Under this Article's
Article's proposed standard for prior adequate notice, therefore,
Doninger's
Doninger's punishment would have been struck down because, among other things, a
reasonable
recognized that her livejoumal.com
livejournal.com
reasonable student in her position would not have recognized
blog posting was subject
subject to the school's jurisdiction
jurisdiction and potentially punishable. At
most, the school
school would have been able to suppress the speech itself by ordering
Doninger
Doninger to remove the relevant
relevant part of her posting from her blog.
2. Substantive Notice
In addition to providing
providing students with adequate
adequate notice about the school's
school's
jurisdictional
reach,
this
Article's
formulation
also
requires schools
jurisdictional
schools to provide
provide students
with sufficient substantive guidance about the types of
speech that are prohibited.
ofspeech
prohibited. It is
not enough simply to say that the Tinker,
Tinker, Fraser,
Fraser,Hazelwood,
and
Morse
decisions
Hazelwood,
themselves provide students with that notice, for two reasons.
First, in marked contrast to the First Amendment
Amendment standards that apply in the outside
world, several of
the
standards
emerging
from the student-speech
ofthe
student-speech framework are quite
broad in nature, such as Hazelwood's
"reasonably
Hazelwood's "reasonably related to legitimate
legitimate pedagogical
46
prongs. 1146
disruption" prongs.
"material
and
rights"
of
"invasion
Tinker's
and
test
concerns"
concerns"
Tinker's "invasion of rights" and "material disruption"
Even assurning,
assuming, for instance, that students know that school officials
officials can restrict
restrict
school-sponsored
speech
as
long
as
they
have
a
legitimate
pedagogical
reason for
school-sponsored
doing so, that does not necessarily translate
translate into any real sense
sense of when that standard
will be invoked. Indeed, in Hazelwood
Hazelwood itself,
the
journalism
itself,
journalism teacher evidently
evidently
considered the articles about divorce and teen pregnancy
acceptable fare for the
pregnancy to be acceptable
high school newspaper, but the principal
principal did not. The Supreme Court deferred to the
principal's articulated pedagogical
pedagogical justifications and thus held that his censorship of
of
the articles did not violate the First Amendment. But that does not mean that the
student journalists
could-have anticipated
journalists should-or
should-or even realistically
realistically could-have
anticipated the particular
particular
concerns
animating
the
principal's
decision,
such
that
it
would
have been appropriate
concerns animating
principal's
for the school to move straight to punishing them for their speech.

145. S.B. 478, LCO No. 2276, Gen. Assem.,
145.
Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009). This proposed bill
Act Concerning
Concerning the Electronic Correspondence
titled,
Correspondence of
Students," was introduced by East
"An Act
ofStudents,"
titled, "An
Hartford
also, e.g.,
e.g., Katie Farrish, Proposal
Calls for
for
[d.; see also,
Proposal Calls
Hartford State
State Senator
Senator Gary LeBeau. Id.;
HearingBefore Kids Labeled Bullies, HARTFORD COURANT,
COuRANT, Feb. 2, 2009.
Hearing
146. The
The Supreme
Brandenburg v. Ohio, for instance, held that the
146.
Supreme Court's decision
decision in Brandenburg
government
encourages others to break the law only when
government could prohibit and punish speech that encourages
"such
advocacy is
directed to
to inciting
inciting or
producing imminent
action and
and is likely to
or producing
imminent lawless
lawless action
"such advocacy
is directed
action." 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969);
(1969); see also,
produce such action."
also, e.g., Gerald Gunther,
incite or produce
Learned
Hand and the Origins
Origins of Modern
FirstAmendment Doctrine:
Doctrine: Some Fragments
Fragmentsof
of
Learned Hand
Modem First
History, 27 STAN.
(stating that the Brandenburg
Brandenburgstandard
History,
STAN. L. REv. 719, 755 (1975)
(1 975)(stating
standard is "the
"the most
most
speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme
generally Thomas Healy,
speech-protective
Supreme Court"). See generally
Brandenburg
Terror, 84 NOTRE
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 655 (2009). The closest
Brandenburg in a Time of
ofTerror,
closest in-school
in-school
material-disruption standard-is
Brandenburg-Tinker's material-disruption
standard-is much broader.
analogue to Brandenburg-Tinker's
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Second,
the other standards that have emerged from
Second, although
although it is true that some of
ofthe
Morse's holding that schools
the Supreme Court speech
speech cases are narrower-such
narrower-such as Morse's
can prohibit speech that advocates
advocates illegal drug use-these standards
standards certainly do not
requireschools to prohibit the speech in question. Some
require
Some schools, for instance, might
choose to give students freer rein in this respect, just as they may choose to self-limit
self-limit
off-campus speech. If schools plan to invoke their
their jurisdiction
jurisdiction over students'
students' off-campus
their
authority to punish
punish students for expressing such views, it is appropriate
appropriate for them to
advise students accordingly.
The clearest form ofsuch
of such notice will occur when the school responds to a particular
particular
instance
speaker in advance not to engage
instance of speech, either by warning the student speaker
engage in
in
Tinker and Fraser)
Fraser)and/or by telling the student to
the specific
specific speech
speech in question (as in Tinker
stop speaking (as in Morse).
Morse). In either case, if the student speaker proceeds
proceeds with the
speech
speech despite such direct admonitions, it will be very difficult for him to argue that he
lacked
lacked adequate
adequate prior notice that he might face punishment for it. Of course, if the
unconstitutional, like the armband ban in Tinker,
Tinker, then any
speech
speech suppression
suppression is itself
itselfunconstitutional,
resultant punishment
unconstitutional as well-and some students may choose
punishment will be unconstitutional
choose
to take their chances and continue with their speech. But should a court conclude
conclude that
notice-based
the school acted within its authority in trying to restrict the speech, any notice-based
argument
argument raised by the student with respect to punishment will be unconvincing.
occur where the only notice comes through a
The closer questions are likely to occur
general
speech-specific interaction. Here, courts will
general school policy, as opposed
opposed to a speech-specific
need to determine
determine whether
whether the relevant
relevant language was sufficiently clear and specific to
enable
enable a reasonable student to recognize
recognize that the speech was prohibited. Where schools
prohibit
prohibit depictions ofparticular
ofparticular slogans or messages (such
(such as, for instance, depictions
148
Confederate flag 148
of drugs147
drugs147 or representations
representations of the Confederate
), prior adequate
adequate notice will
likely be found. On the other hand, some school policies include bans that are more
general in nature-such
nature--such as policies
policies that simply track, without elaboration, the more
Supreme Court's studentgeneral standards
standards that have been announced
announced in some of the Supreme
all speech
speech cases. A blanket prohibition
prohibition of
ofall
speech that disrupts the educational process
of other students,149
students, 149 for example, will not always provide
or invades the rights ofother
provide students
speech is prohibited.15
with enough guidance as to whether
whether a particular
particular instance of
ofspeech
prohibited. ISO0 Of
Of

Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing school dress
See, e.g.,
147. See,
e.g., Barr v. Lafon,
code that prohibited
prohibited clothing that "exhibits written, pictorial, or implied references
references to illegal
Morse's aftermath, many schools may well adopt similar
similar
substances, drugs, or alcohol"). In Morse's
policies.
See, e.g., B.W.A. v. Farmington
148. See,
Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009).
149. For example, the dress code in Barr
Barr went on to prohibit
prohibit clothing
clothing which displayed
"negative slogans"
slogans" or
or "cause[d]
"cause[d] disruption
disruption to
process." 538
538 F.3d at 556.
"negative
to the
the educational
educational process."
150. Such broadly worded
worded policies also have the potential to sweep in at least some protected
v. State College
College Area School
speech, raising overbreadth
overbreadth concerns. For example, in Saxe v.
District, the Third Circuit-in an opinion written by then-Judge
District,
then-Judge Alito-struck
A1ito-struck down as
"verbal or
or
unconstitutional a school policy that prohibited harassment, which
which it defined as "verbal
physical conduct based on one's actual
actual or perceived race, religion, color, national origin,
gender, sexual
sexual orientation,
orientation, disability, or other personal
personal characteristics,
characteristics, and which has the
performance or
educational performance
substantially interfering with a student's educational
or
purpose or effect of substantially
environment." 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 200
2001).
creating an intimidating, hostile
hostile or offensive
offensive environment."
I).
The opinion concluded that the policy extended
extended beyond the speech restrictions authored
authored by the
Supreme Court framework, reasoning:
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of broad policies, some speech will be so clearly violative
course, even in the context
context ofbroad
that it disposes of any concern
concern about prior notice. When there is a closer question,
however, schools should focus on suppressing the speech itself rather than punishing
the student speaker,
speaker to stop
speaker, at least until they directly instruct the student speaker
engaging in his speech and he refuses
refuses to do so.

B. Reasonableness
Reasonablenessof
the Punishment
ofthe
Punishment
Even where a punishment
punishment is predicated
predicated on adequate
adequate prior notice to the student
student
students' constitutional
ofstudents'
constitutional
speaker, that alone does not guarantee adequate
adequate protection of
rights. As a backstop,
backstop, courts should also require that in cases
cases where speech is punished
under the Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morseframework (as opposed to situations where
speech is entirely unprotected by the First Amendment, as in the case of true threats,
incitements to imminent lawless action, and the like), the ultimate punishment
itself be
punishment itselfbe
reasonable.
The Supreme
Supreme Court
issue,' 5' and to the extent that
Court has not specifically ruled on this issue,151
lower courts have considered it, they are divided over whether their First Amendment
Amendment
inquiry can extend beyond
beyond a speech
speech analysis into an assessment of the punishment
itself. Most of this division stems
itself
sterns from a failure to appreciate the distinction
distinction between
student speech that falls entirely outside of First Amendment
Amendment protection
protection and student
student
speech that can be restricted
restricted only because of the school-specific
school-specific
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
altogether
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse framework. Where the speech is altogether
unprotected by the First Amendment-such
Amendment-such that any speaker, in any setting, could face
civil and/or criminal sanctions for it-it makes sense for courts to refrain from
engaging in any substantive
substantive review ofwhether
of whether the student speaker's punishment was
reasonable. In such cases, there is no real First Amendment
Amendment interest at all. Here, the
[T]he Policy
punishes not
not only
only speech
speech that actually
actually causes disruption,
disruption, but
but also
[T]he
Policy punishes
so.... This ignores Tinker's requirement
requirement that a
speech that merely intends to do so....
school must reasonably
reasonably believe that speech will cause actual, material disruption
before prohibiting it.
In addition,
addition, even
even ifthe
if the "purpose"
"purpose" component
component is
do not
not believe
believe that
that
is ignored,
ignored, we
we do
In
prohibited "harassment,"
defined by
by the Policy,
Policy, necessarily
necessarily rises
rises to the level of
of
prohibited
"harassment," as defined
a substantial disruption under Tinker.
Tinker....
...
. . . Although [the school district] correctly
correctly asserts
asserts that it has a compelling
compelling
interest in promoting
promoting an educational environment that is safe and conducive to
learning, it fails to provide any particularized
particularized reason as to why it anticipates
anticipates
substantial disruption
student speech
ofstudent
speech prohibited under the
disruption from the broad swath of
Policy.
Id.
at 216-17;
216-17; cf
cf Nuxoll v.
v. Indian
Prairie Sch.
Sch. Dist.,
Dist., 523 F.3d
F.3d 668,669,675-76
668, 669, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2008)
/d. at
Indian Prairie
(upholding the
that prohibited
prohibited derogatory
derogatory comments
about aa
of aa school
school rule
rule that
comments about
(upholding
the constitutionality
constitutionality of
student's race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability, but holding that a
student T-shirt stating
"Be Happy, Not
Not Gay,"
Gay," was only "tepidly
negative" and
and not sufficiently
"tepidly negative"
sufficiently
student
stating "Be
derogatory to fall within the policy).
151. Indeed,
Indeed, the plaintiffs
Tinker, Fraser,
Fraser,and Morse do not seem to have raised this as a
151.
plaintiffs in Tinker,
separate issue.
(Hazelwood,ofcourse,
of course, did
did not
punishment at
not involve
involve aa punishment
at all.)
all.) As discussed above,
separate
issue. (Hazelwood,
Fraser
did challenge
his specific
specific punishment,
on grounds
grounds of
inadequate notice
rather than
of inadequate
notice rather
than
Fraser did
challenge his
punishment, but
but on
substantive unreasonableness.
unreasonableness. See supra
accompanying text.
substantive
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying
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only limitation on such punishments
punishments should stem from the relevant state laws and
and
regulations52 regarding
required
regulations
regarding student discipline, as well as the procedural protections required
52
GOSS.1
by Goss.1
By contrast, when a speech restriction is justified
justified only pursuant to the ratcheteddown
down First Amendment protection
protection afforded to students in schools-in other
other words,
when the speech
speech would otherwise
otherwise be protected-then
protected-then courts'
courts' First Amendment analysis
should
certainly defer to the
should include a reasonableness
reasonableness review. Although courts should
should certainly
of educators and school boards in this respect, they should still
pedagogical
pedagogical judgments
judgments ofeducators
independent review sufficient to rectify any abuses of discretion.
exercise
exercise independent
far, however, courts have not explicitly
Thus far,
explicitly focused on the distinction
distinction between
these two categories
categories of student-speech
student-speech cases. Some courts have simply assumed that
their review
review must end once they determine that the school was entitled to punish the
speech on any grounds. In Doninger,
Doninger, for instance,
instance, the district court
court stated:
[W]hether disqualifying
disqualifying [Doninger]
[Doninger] from running for class secretary
secretary is a "fitting
"fitting
punishment"
punishment" in the circumstances, or was overly harsh or even too lenient, is not
decide....
for this Court to determine.
detennine. That is for school officials to decide....

.
authorities made the permissible decision to punish
. . . Once school authorities
[Doninger] for her blog entry, the scope of that punishment lay within their
[Doninger]
discretion. The Court defers to their experience
experience and judgment, and has no wish to
into
administrators' decision-making
insert itself
the
intricacies
of
the
school administrators'
decision-making
3
15
process.153
process.
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have expressed
expressed similar views, both citing the Supreme
Court's statement
in
the
1975
case
of
Wood v. Stricklani
Strickland'5544 that "[i]t is not the role of
of
statement
1975
federal courts to set aside decisions ofschool
of school administrators
administrators which the court may view
view
as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.,,155
compassion."' 55 Interestingly, unlike the blog posting
posting

152. See supra
supra text accompanying
accompanying notes 112-13.
153. Doningerv. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199,202,215
199, 202, 215 (D. Conn. 2007).
153.
154. 420 U.S. 308
308 (1975).
(1975).
Id. at 326. The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in Ponce
v. Socorro
155. Id.
Ponce v.
Socorro Independent
Independent
School District,
District,a case involving a student's writings about a plan to commit a "Columbine
"Columbine
shooting" attack on the high school. 508 F.3d 765, 766
shooting"
766 (5th Cir. 2007). The Ponce
Ponce court
concluded that this amounted to threatening
threatening speech "as much beyond the constitutional
constitutional pale as
'fire' in [a] crowded
theater," that "such
yelling 'fire'
crowded theater,"
"such specific threatening
threatening speech to a school or its
population is unprotected
unprotected by the First Amendment,"
Amendment," and that:
Because we conclude that no constitutional
constitutional violation
violation has occurred, our inquiry
decisions of
ends here. Our role is to enforce constitutional rights, not "to set aside decisions
of
school administrators
administrators which [we]
[we] may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or
compassion."
compassion." Because
Because the journal's threatening
threatening language
language is not protected
protected by the
First Amendment, [the school
school district's] disciplinary action against
against [the student]
violated no protected right.
Id.
(1975)) (citations omitted).
Id. at 772 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975»
Pulaski County
County Special School
The Eighth Circuit followed a similar rationale in Doe v. Pulaski
District, which involved
obscenity-laden rants
District,
involved an eighth grader's
grader's "violent,
"violent, misogynic, and obscenity-laden
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Doninger,the student speech at issue in the Fifth and Eighth Circuit cases consisted
consisted
in Doninger,
of true threats that were altogether
altogether unprotected
unprotected by the First Amendment. Neither the
Fifth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit, however, relied on that fact in declining to analyze
the reasonableness of
the students'
students' punishments. Instead, the decisions'
decisions' broad language
ofthe
language
deference to school authorities suggests that these courts would have
about the need for deference
refused to review these punishments
punishments even had the speech been regulated solely under
under
ultimately
the specialized
specialized student-speech
student-speech framework. In fact, the Fifth Circuit, while ultimately
speech amounted to a true threat, also included
settling on the rationale that the speech
language
Morse's concern
concern about the
language suggesting
suggesting that its holding was partially based on Morse's
56
"true threat"
safety of students. 156 Similarly, the Sixth
Sixth Circuit recently
recently blended the ''true
standard with language
language from Tinker
Tinker and Morse to hold that a school could suspend
standard
suspend a
student for writing in her notebook about killing her math teacher; the court further
indicated
substantive reasonableness
not engage in any review of the substantive
reasonableness of
of
indicated that it would
57
that punishment.1
punishment. 15?
By
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that at least where a student-speech
student-speech
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morseframework,
restriction has been upheld under the Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
consider the reasonableness
reasonableness of
the punishment
ofthe
punishment itself.
itself. In La Vine
courts can proceed to consider

expressing a desire to molest, rape, and murder" his ex-girlfriend. 306 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.
Cir.
2002). The court concluded that the letter containing these rants "amounted
"amounted to a true threat,"
threat," and
that the school board therefore did not violate the student's
student's First Amendment rights by expelling
him.
Id. at 626-27. The court commented further:
him.ld.
Had we been sitting as the school board, we might very well have approached the
situation differently, for it appears to us that the board's
board's action taken against [the
student] was unnecessarily harsh. Other options have occurred to us that could
have furthered the district's interest in protecting its students, as well as have
punished [the student], but also have aided him in understanding the severity
severity and
and
inappropriateness
inappropriateness of his conduct. However, "[i]t is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside decisions ofschool
of school administrators which
which the court may view as
lacking
basis in
or compassion."
compassion."
lacking aa basis
in wisdom
wisdom or
Id.
Id. at 627 (quoting
(quoting Wood
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,326
308, 326 (1975) (third
(third alteration in
in original).
The dissent, by contrast, criticized the majority for "acknowledg[ing]
"acknowledg[ing] that the school board's
board's
expulsion
of [the student]..
[deferring] to the board's discretion."
student] .... was unnecessarily harsh, yet [deferring]
expulsion of[the
Id.
Id. at 633 (Heaney,
(Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed that the speech could have been
been
"reasonablyregulated
by school
school administrators
administrators to
to prevent
disruption," but
"reasonably
regulated by
prevent substantial
substantial disruption,"
but thought
thought
that the school board had "failed
"failed to exercise
in
exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making"
decision-making" in
"obliged to impose our judgment
expelling the student, and that the court was "obliged
judgment where there has
discretion, as in this case."
case." Id.
been an abuse of discretion,
Id. at 627, 633-34
633-34 (emphasis in original).
156. Ponce,
Ponce, 508 F.3d at 768-72
of this case..,
768-72 ("The constitutional
constitutional concerns ofthis
case ... fall precisely
precisely
within the student speech area demarcated
demarcated by Justice Alito in Morse.
Morse. That area consists
consists of
of
of the school setting....
setting....
speech pertaining to grave
grave harms arising from the particular
particular character ofthe
If school administrators are permitted to prohibit student speech that advocates illegal drug use.
Ifschool
use .
then it
it defies
extrapolation to
hold school
school administrators
to aa stricter
stricter standard
with
..,
. , then
defies logical
logical extrapolation
to hold
administrators to
standard with
respect to speech that gravely and uniquely threatens violence, including massive deaths, to the
the
school population as aa whole.").
978, 984-85 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating, in
157. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978,984-85
permanent record of her suspension be removed, that
response to student's request that the permanent
"[t]he plaintiffs fail to convince
convince us that permanent
documentation of the disciplinary action
action
permanent documentation
taken against Rachel, which did not itself violate her constitutional
constitutional rights, could somehow
violate her First Amendment rights").
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58
a high school junior was "emergency
"emergency expelled"
v. Blaine
Blaine School District,
District,158
expelled" after he
showed
showed his English teacher a poem that he had written about committing a school
59
shooting.'159
A letter to the student's parents that documented
documented the reasons for the
shooting.
6°
expulsion
file.1l60
Seventeen days later, pursuant to a
expulsion was placed in the student's file.
Seventeen
psychiatrist's
psychiatrist's conclusion that it was safe for the student to return to school, his
lifted.161
appealed the sanction to
expulsion was lifted.
161 The student and his parents,
parents, however, appealed
the school board, concerned
concerned that the letter describing
describing his expulsion would hurt his
62
of entering the military.
military.'162
chances ofentering
The school board affirmed the expulsion but agreed
to re-write the letter to emphasize that the student had been expelled
expelled for safety rather
63
than disciplinary reasons. 163
Unsatisfied with this outcome, the student and his parents
filed suit in federal court, seeking damages as well as an order enjoining
enjoining the school
64
expulsion.'164
from maintaining any letter in the student's file regarding
regarding the expulsion.
The La Vine
court ultimately concluded
concluded that although the emergency
emergency expulsion had been justified
165
reference to the expulsion
expulsion from the
Tinker,165
the school
school should remove any reference
under Tinker,
"school need not permanently
student's file, reasoning that the "school
permanently blemish [the student's]
employment.' ' 166 The Ninth
Ninth Circuit's
Circuit's
record and harm his ability to secure
secure future employment.,,166
LaVine decision, which
separate reasonableness
which implicitly endorsed a separate
reasonableness review, thus
stands in sharp contrast
contrast to the approaches later adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits.
167
BoardofEducation,167
More recently, in Wisniewski v. Boarda/Education,
the Second Circuit explicitly
explicitly
of whether, when a speech restriction
declined to weigh in on the question ofwhether,
restriction is justified
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse framework, there are still independent
independent
by the Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
68
constitutional limitations on the extent of the student
punishment.1168
constitutional
student speaker's
speaker's punishment.
Also
Wood's quotation about deference to school administrators, the Second Circuit
citing Wood's
specifically raised this argument, and thus it need not be
noted that69the student had not specifically
be
1
reached. 169

158. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
2001).
159. Id.
180-40-295 of the
Id. at 983-86. The emergency expulsion
expulsion was pursuant to section
section 180-40-295
Washington Administrative
Administrative Code, which provides
Washington
provides the following:
[A] student may be expelled immediately
immediately by a school district superintendent
superintendent or a
designee...
student's
... [based on] good and sufficient
sufficient reason to believe that the student's
designee
presence poses
immediate and continuing danger to the student, other students,
presence
poses an
an immediate
or school personnel
personnel or an immediate
immediate and continuing threat of substantial
disruption of the educational process.
WASH. ADMiN.
180-40-295 (2008).
ADMIN. CODE § 180-40-295
160. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 986.
161. Id.
Id.
162.
162. Id.
Id.
163. Id.
163.
Id.
164. Id.
164.
Id.
165. The court explicitly declined to evaluate the school's argument
argument that the student's poem
"was
'true threat'
and not protected
protected by
by the First Amendment
at all,"
all," explaining
explaining that itit was
"was aa 'true
threat' and
Amendment at
instead
Id. at
at 989
989 n.5.
Tinker.ld.
n.5.
instead solely
solely resolving
resolving the
the case
case under
under Tinker.
at992.
166. Id.
Id. at
992.
167.
167. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
at40.
168. Id.
Id. at
40.
169. Id.
contend that the First Amendment
Id. ("Although
("Although the Appellants contend
Amendment barred the imposition
of
any discipline,
discipline, they
make no
no distinct
distinct challenge
challenge to
the extent
extent ofthe
of the discipline.
discipline. Thus,
we need
ofany
they make
to the
Thus, we
need
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Going forward, courts
courts should recognize
recognize the distinction between
between student speech that
is entirely unprotected
by
the
First
Amendment
and
student
Amendment
student speech that can be
unprotected
suppressed only under the specialized
specialized Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse
Tinker/Fraser/Hazelwood/Morse framework,
and review for reasonableness
reasonableness any punishments imposed under the latter approach.
(This, ofcourse,
of course, will require
require them to specify which path justified the school's actions,
170
While courts'
override the
as opposed to eliding that question.)
question.)170
courts' hesitancy to override
administrators is understandable,
understandable, they should recognize that the
decisions of school administrators
admonition is largely
inapplicable here. In Wood,
Wood, the Court
largely inapplicable
Supreme Court's Wood admonition
student-plaintiffs-who were expelled from high school
school after
concluded that the student-plaintiffs-who
spiking punch served at a club meeting, and who claimed that there was insufficient
insufficient
evidence before the school board to prove that the malt liquor they used was in fact
1711 The Wood Court
intoxicating-had no valid constitutional
intoxicating-had
constitutional claim at all. 17
Court explained:
Public high school students do have substantive and procedural rights while at
school. But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal courts
evidentiary questions
questions arising
arising in school
school disciplinary
evidentiary
disciplinary proceedings
proceedings or the proper
construction of school regulations. The system
construction
system of public education that has
of
evolved in this Nation relies necessarily
necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of
school administrators
administrators and school board members, and §§ 1983
1983 was not intended to
of errors in
ofthat discretion
be a vehicle for federal-court corrections
corrections oferrors
in the exercise ofthat

constitutionalguarantees.
specific constitutional
violationsof
level of
the level
to the
not rise
which do not
rise to
ofviolations
ofspecific
guarantees. 172
172

Wood, students who assert that they were excessively
Unlike the plaintiffs in Wood,
excessively punished
guarantee at the root of their claim:
constitutional guarantee
for their speech
speech do have a specific constitutional
the First Amendment. As discussed above, student speech
speech that is regulated pursuant
pursuant to
the specialized
specialized Supreme
Supreme Court framework exists in an intermediate state: even though
protected by the First Amendment, the "special
"special
such speech would otherwise
otherwise be protected
characteristics" of
schools-namely, their need to protect and educate their studentsofschools-namely,
studentscharacteristics"
gives them broader rein to restrict it. Just as that compromise
of balance when
compromise falls out ofbalance
when
student speakers
speakers are punished without adequate
prior
notice,
so
too
does
it falter when
adequate
the punishment
punishment is unreasonable in light of the protective and educative rationales
rationales
underlying the framework.
Thus, in proceeding
reasonableness even after
ultimate reasonableness
after
proceeding to a consideration
consideration of ultimate
concluding
that
some
degree
of
student
speaker
punishment
punishment was justified under the
concluding
student speech framework, courts
overstepping their bounds or violating the
courts are not overstepping
Amendment
not determine
determine whether such a challenge would have to be grounded on the First Amendment
substantive component
Fourteenth Amendment.
itself or the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
And we are mindful that '[i]t
'[i]t is not the role of federal courts to set aside decisions of school
compassion.' However,
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.'
of a properly presented
the one
in the absence ofa
presented challenge,
challenge, we do not decide whether the length of
ofthe
exceeded whatever
constitutional limitation might exist."
semester suspension exceeded
whatever constitutional
exist." (quoting Wood
Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975))
(1975» (citations omitted)).
omitted».
170. As discussed above, both the Fifth Circuit in Ponce and the Sixth Circuit in Boim
Bairn
employed both
both the "true threat" rationale and the specialized Supreme Court framework in
Wisniewski court followed the Ninth
upholding the school district's actions. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, the Wisniewski
Circuit's LaVine approach of skipping over the true threat analysis and moving
moving straight to a
Tinker assessment. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
171. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
308, 323-26 (1975).
(1975).
171.
172. Id.
Id. at 326 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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framework. Rather, they are fulfilling its underlying
underlying purpose and rationale. Where
courts truly believe that the punishment
punishment imposed was so excessive
excessive as to constitute an
abuse of discretion, they should rule accordingly,
accordingly, even if they believe that some level
of punishment would have been justified. Such an approach
appropriately echoes the
ofpunishment
approach appropriately
of Education v. Pico 173 that although
Supreme Court plurality's observation
observation in Board
Board ofEducation
"local
... the
"local school boards have broad discretion in the management
management of school affairs ...
discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of education must be
be
exercised
exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent
transcendent imperatives
imperatives of the First
First
Amendment."
Amendment."
Importantly, this Article's point is not that the reasonableness
reasonableness or leniency of a
punishment
punishment should drive the initial speech analysis-the
analysis-the path that the Second
Second Circuit
Circuit
unfortunately took in Doninger,
Doninger, when it held that because the student had only been
enough to show that her speech
disqualified as class secretary, it was enough
speech had risked
risked
speaker's punishment
disrupting student
student government. That a student speaker's
punishment was relatively
extracurricular activity, should not
minor, or limited to a particular
particular context such as an extracurricular
Tinker,Fraser,
alter the rigor with which Tinker,
Fraser, Hazelwood,
Hazelwood, and Morse are applied. Such an
approach, as discussed
discussed above, provides schools with too much power to restrict student
speech: a letter
letter opposing the football coach will almost always risk some disruption to
the football team, just as any speech criticizing
criticizing the school administration
administration may well risk
risk
some friction in the operation
operation of student government. To ensure that students have
adequate room to express their opinions about important school issues and are not
deterred by potential repercussions
repercussions to important aspects oftheir
of their lives at school, courts
deterred
must hold constant the basic student speech standards, rather than ratcheting them
down relative to the punishment
punishment at issue.
Indeed, the specific
specific reasonableness
reasonableness review proposed
proposed by this Article would in no way
expand schools'
schools' authority
authority to restrict student speech. Rather, this review
review would only
kick in after an assessment
suppressible at all and (2)
assessment of whether
whether (1) the speech was suppressible
(2)
whether (in the case of student
student punishment) adequate prior notice was provided. It
would thus serve as an additional,
independent source of protection for student
student
additional, independent
speakers.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

A spirit of compromise pervades
pervades the Supreme
Supreme Court's approach to students'
students'
contexts-including students'
students' Fourth Amendment
Amendment
constitutional rights. In multiple contexts-including
searches and seizures, their Fourteenth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable
unreasonable searches
Amendment
right to procedural due process, and of course their First Amendment right to free
speech-the Court has rejected arguments
students' constitutional rights stop "at
"at
speech-the
arguments that students'
gate," but has also held that these rights require modification in light
the schoolhouse
schoolhouse gate,"
74
Supreme Court has consistently sought
of school exigencies. 174 Thus, the Supreme
sought a balance
balance

(1982) (plurality opinion).
173. 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982)
174. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 331-41
331-41 (1985)
(1985) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to school authorities'
searches
of
students
but that such searches-rather
searches-rather
authorities'
satisfy the Fourth Amendment's
than requiring
requiring probable
probable cause and a warrant-need
warrant-need only satisfY
Amendment's
"fundamental command" of
reasonableness because
"fundamental
ofreasonableness
because "the school setting requires some easing of
of
restrictions"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,575-84 (1975)
(1975) (holding that school suspensions
the restrictions");
implicate students'
students' procedural due process
process rights but that only the rudimentary
rudimentary aspects of due
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students' constitutional
between
between preserving
preserving both the essential core of students'
constitutional rights and
schools' needs to maintain
schools'
maintain safe, effective
effective learning environments.
environments.
This compromise approach
approach extends into the student speech framework itself,
itself, which
which
Tinker)
independent student speech
draws a sharp distinction between
between independent
speech (governed
(governed by Tinker)
and school-sponsored
school-sponsored student speech (governed byHazelwood).
by Hazelwood). Yet the student speech
framework currently
currently fails to account for an equally important
important dividing line: the method
method
by which student speech
speech is restricted. Although the framework strikes an appropriate
balance in the context of speech suppression, it lacks the heightened
heightened protections that
counter-balance student punishments.
would appropriately
appropriately counter-balance
By requiring that any student punishments be based on adequate prior notice and be
substantively reasonable, courts can restore this balance. In so doing, they will ensure
substantively
adequately
speakers' First Amendment
Amendment and due process
that student
student speakers'
process interests are adequately
protected regardless of the speech restriction used, while still affording schools the
turn, will fulfill the
harmful speech. This, in tum,
flexibility they need to respond quickly to harmful
underlying
underlying rationale and purpose of the Supreme
Supreme Court's
Court's student speech framework.

"further formalizing
informal hearing-are
process-notice
process-notice and an infonnal
hearing-are required because "further
fonnalizing the
formality and adversary nature may not only make it too
suspension process
process and escalating
escalating its fonnality
costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness
effectiveness as part of the teaching
process").
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